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Investment in Human Capital:
Rates of Return
The most important single determinant of the amount invested in
human capital may well be its profitability or rate of return, but the
effect on earnings of a change in the rate of return has been difficult
to distinguish empirically from a change in the amount invested. For
since investment in human capital usually extends over a long and
variable period, the amount invested cannot be determined from a
known "investment period." Moreover, the discussion of on-the-job
training clearly indicated that the amount invested is often merged
with gross earnings into a single net earnings concept (which is gross
earnings minus the cost of or plus the return on investment).
1. Relation between Earnings, Costs, and Rates of Return
In this section, some important relations between earnings, invest-
ment costs, and rates of return are derived. They permit one to dis-
tinguish, among other things, a change in the return from a change
in the amount invested. The discussion proceeds in stages from simple
to complicated situations. First, investment is restricted to a single
period and returns to all remaining periods; then investment is dis-
tributed over a known group of periods called the investment period.
Finally, it is shown how the rate of return, the amount invested, and
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the investment period can all be derived from information on net
earnings alone.
The discussion is from the viewpoint of workers and is, therefore,
restricted to general investments; since the analysis of specific invest-
ments and firms is very similar, its discussion is omitted.
Let Y be an activity providing a person entering at a particular
age, called age zero, with a real net earnings stream of Yo during the
first period, Yr during the next period, and so on until Yn during the
last period. The general term "activity" rather than occupation or an-
other more concrete term is used in order to indicate that any kind of
investment in human capital is permitted, not just on-the-job train-
ing but also schooling, information, health, and morale. As in the
previous chapter, "net" earnings mean "gross" earnings during any
period minus tuition costs during the same period. "Real" earnings
are the sum of monetary earnings and the monetary equivalent of
psychic earnings. Since many persons appear to believe that the term
"investment in human capital" must be restricted to monetary costs
and returns, let me emphasize that essentially the whole analysis ap-
plies independently of the division of real earnings into monetary and
psychic components. Thus the analysis applies to health, which has a
large psychic component, as well as to on-the-job training, which has
a large monetary component. When psychic components dominate,
the language associated with consumer durable goods might be con-
sidered more appropriate than that associated with investment goods;
to simplify the presentation, investment language is used throughout
The present value of the net earnings stream in Y would be
(is)
where i is the market discount rate, assumed for simplicity to be the
same in each period. If X were another activity providing a net earn-
ing stream of Xo, Xl3 . . . XH, with a present value of V(X), the
present value of the gain from choosing Y would be given by
(19)
i The discussion assumes discrete income flows and compounding, even though a
mathematically more elegant formulation would have continuous variables, with
sums replaced by integrals and discount rates by continuous compounding. The dis-
crete approach is, however, easier to follow and yields the same kind of results.
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Equation (19) can be reformulated to bring out explicitly the rela-
tion between costs and returns. The cost of investing in human
capital equals the net earnings foregone by choosing to invest rather
than choosing an activity requiring no investment. If activity Y re-
quires an investment only in the initial period and if X does not
require any, the cost of choosing Y rather than X is simply the differ-
ence between their net earnings in the initial period, and the total
return would be the present value of the differences between net
earnings in later periods. If C = Xo — Yo, kj = Yi — Xjt j = 1, . . . n,




The relation between costs and returns can be derived in a different
and, for our purposes, preferable way by denning the internal rate of
return,
2 which is simply a rate of discount equating the present value
of returns to the present value of costs. In other words, the internal
rate, r, is denned implicitly by the equation
which clearly implies
n y n y
since C = Xo — Yi} and kj = Yj — X7. So the internal rate is also a
rate of discount equating the present values of net earnings. These
equations would be considerably simplified if the return were the
same in each period, or Yj = Xj + k, j = I, . . . n. Thus equation (21)
would become
C = \ [1 - (1 + r)-], (23)
2 A substantial literature has developed on the difference between the income gain
and internal return approaches. See, for example, Friedrich and Vera Lutz, The
Theory of Investment of the Firm, Princeton, 1951, Chapter ii, and the articles in
The Management of Corporate Capital, Ezra Solomon, ed., Glencoe, 1959.62 INVESTMENT IN HUMAN CAPITAL: RATES OF RETURN
where (1 + r)r
n is a correction for the finiteness of life that tends
toward zero as people live longer.
If investment is restricted to a single known period, cost and rate
of return are easily determined from information on net earnings
alone. Since investment in human capital is distributed over many
periods—formal schooling is usually more than ten years in the United
States, and long periods of on-the-job tra-'ning are aiso common—the
analysis must, however, be generalized to cover distributed invest-
ment. The definition of an internal rate in terms of the present value
of net earnings in different activities obviously applies regardless of
the amount and duration of investment, but the definition in terms
of costs and returns is not generalized so readily. If investment were
known to occur in Y dunng each of the first m periods, a simple and
superficially appealing approach would be to define the investment
cost in each of these periods as the difference between net earnings in
X and Y, total investment costs as the present value of these differ-
ences, and the internal rate would equate total costs and returns. In
symbols,
f i y \r " n _, -I
Kjj — A.j I j, ] — U, . . . 771 I,
and
T \\ ~\~ T)
If m — 1, this reduces to equation (23).
Two serious drawbacks mar this appealing straightforward ap-
proach. The estimate of total costs requires a priori knowledge and
specification of the investment period. While the period covered by
formal schooling is easily determined, the period covered by much
on-the-job training and other investment is not, and a serious error
might result from an incorrect specification: to take an extreme
example, total costs would approach zero as the investment period is




Z (*/ - r»)(l + ')->, lim & = X) (*»• - Wl + ')-' = 0,
0 m^>n o
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A second difficulty is that the differences between net earnings in
X and Y do not correctly measure the cost of investing in Y since
they do not correctly measure earnings foregone. A person who in-
vested in the initial period could receive more than Xx in period 1
as long as the initial investment yielded a positive return.
4 The true
cost of an investment in period 1 would be the total earnings fore-
gone, or the difference between what could have been received and
what is received. The difference between X1 and Yx could greatly un-
derestimate true costs; indeed, Yx might be greater than Xx even
though a large investment was made in period I.
5 In general, there-
fore, the amount invested in any period would be determined not
only from net earnings in the same period but also from net earnings
in earlier periods.
If the cost of an investment is consistently defined as the earnings
foregone, quite different estimates of total costs emerge. Although
superficially a less natural and straightforward approach, the general-
ization from a single period to distributed investment is actually
greatly simplified. Therefore, let C; be the foregone earnings in the
/
t
h period, r, the rate of return on Cjy and let the return per period on
Cj be a constant kjt with k = ^kj being the total return on the whole
investment. If the number of periods were indefinitely large, and if
investment occurred only in the first m periods, the equation relating
costs, returns, and internal rates would have the strikingly simple
form of
 6
4 If Co was the initial investment, r0 its internal rate, and if the return were the
same in all years, the amount
-f-
1 - (1 + r«)"»
could be received in period 1.
5 Yx is greater than Xj if
1 - (1 + ro)-» 1 - (1 + ro)~
n
where Cx is the investment in period 1.
6 A proof is straightforward. An investment in period j would yield a return of
the amount k}= rjCj in each succeeding period if the number of periods were in-
finite and the return were the same in each. Since the total return is the sum of indi-
vidual returns,
m— 1 m— 1 rn—1 p
I am indebted to Helen Raffel for important suggestions which led to this simple
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Total cost, defined simply as the sum of costs during each period,
would equal the capitalized value of returns, the rate of capitalization
being a weighted average of the rates of return on the individual
investments. Any sequence of internal rates or investment costs is
permitted, no matter what the pattern of rises and declines, or the
form of investments, be they a college education, an apprenticeship,
ballet lessons, or a medical examination. Different investment pro-
grams would have the same ultimate effect on earnings whenever the
average rate of return and the sum of investment costs were the same.
7
Equation (25) could be given an interesting interpretation if all
rates of return were the same. The term k/r would then be the value
at the beginning of the m
t
h period of all succeeding net earning dif-
ferentials between Y and X discounted at the internal rate, r.
8 Total
costs would equal the value also at the beginning of the m
t
h period—
which is the end of the investment period—of the first m differentials
between X and Y? The value of the first m differentials between X
7 Note that the rate of return equating the present values of net earnings in X
and Y is not necessarily equal to r, for it would weight the rates of return on earlier
investments more heavily than r does. For example, if rates were higher on invest-
ments in earlier than in later periods, the overall rate would be greater than r, and
vice versa if rates were higher in later periods. Sample calculations indicate, how-
ever, that the difference between the overall rate and r tends to be small as long as
the investnienl period was not very long and the systematic difference between in-
ternal rates not very great.
8 That is,
J£ (Y,•- X,)(\ + r)--«-» = k £ (1 + r)"-
1
j = m m
9 Since, by definition,
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and Y must equal the value of all succeeding differentials between
Y and X, since r would be the rate of return equating the present
values in X and Y.
The internal rate of return and the amount invested in each of the
first m periods could be estimated from the net earnings streams in
X and Y alone if the rate of return were the same on all investments.
For the internal rate r could be determined from the condition that
the present value of net earnings must be the same in X and Y, and
the amount invested in each period seriatim from the relations
1
0
Co = Xo — YQ, CI = X\ — Y\ -f- rCo




Xj - Yj = C, - r X)
 Ck, 0 < ; < m,
then
m— 1 m— 1 / j — 1 \
(AT,- - r,)(i + r)
m-





i=o y=o \ o /
TO-1
TO-1
= Z c, = c.
o
The analytical difference between the naive definition of costs advanced earlier
and one in terms of foregone earnings is that the former measures total costs by the
value of earning differentials at the beginning of the investment period and the
latter by the value at the end of the period. Therefore, C
l = C(l + ry~
m, which fol-
lows from equation (24) when n = oo.
i° If the rate of return were not the same on all investments, there would be 2m
unknowns—Co, . . . Cm^, and r0, . . . rm_x—and only m + 1 equations—the m cost definitions and the equation
TO-1
k = Z T&.
0
An additional m — 1 relation would be required to determine the 2m unknowns.
The condition rn = r1= . . . rm_t is only one form these m — 1 relations can take; another is that costs decrease at certain known rates. If the latter were assumed, all
the r4 could be determined from the earnings data.
11 In econometric terminology this set of equations forms a "causal chain" because
of the natural time ordering provided by the aging process. Consequently, there is
no identification or "simultaneity" problem.66 INVESTMENT IN HUMAN CAPITAL: RATES OF RETURN
Thus costs and the rate of return can be estimated from information
on net earnings. This is fortunate since the return on human capital
is never empirically separated from other earnings and the cost of
such capital is only sometimes and incompletely separated.
The investment period of education can be measured by years of
schooling, but the periods of on-the-job training, of the search for
information, and of other investments are not readily available.
Happily, one need not know the investment period to estimate costs
and returns, since all three can be simultaneously estimated from
information on net earnings. If activity X were kfrown to have no
investment (a zero investment period), the amount invested in Y
during any period would be defined by
Ci = Xi- r,- + r£ct, all;, (28) o
and total costs by
C = YJCj. (29)
o
The internal rate could be determined in the usual way from the
equality between present values in X and Y, costs in each period from
equation (28), and total costs from equation (29).
The definition of costs presented here simply extends to all periods
the definition advanced earlier for the investment period.
1
2 The




at period m (see footnote 9), total costs could be estimated from the value of all
differentials at the end of the earning period. That is,
0 0
Thus the value of all differentials would equal zero at the beginning of the earning
period—by definition of the internal rate—and C at the end. The apparent paradox
results from the infinite horizon, as can be seen from the following equation relating
the value of the first / differentials at the beginning of the gth period to costs:
/-I /-I
V{f, g) = £, (*i - ^0(1 + r)>-i-> = X C>(1 + r)°~f.
y=o y=o
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rationale for the general definition is the same: investment occurs in
Y whenever earnings there are below the sum of those in X and the
income accruing on prior investments. If costs were found to be
greater than zero before some period m and equal to zero thereafter,
the first m periods would be the empirically derived investment
period. But costs and returns can be estimated from equation (28)
even when there is no simple investment period.
A common objection to an earlier draft of this paper was that the
general and rather formal definition of costs advanced here is all
right when applied to on-the-job training, schooling, and other recog-
nized investments, but goes too far by also including as investment
costs many effects that should be treated otherwise.
Thus, so the protest might run, learning would automatically lead
to a convex and relatively steep earnings profile not because of any
associated investment in education or training, but because the well-
known "learning curve" is usually convex and rather steep. Since the
method presented here, however, depends only on the shape of age-
earnings profiles, the effect of learning would be considered an effect
of investment in human capital. 1 accept the argument fully; indeed,
I believe that it points up the power rather than the weakness of my
analysis and the implied concept of human capital.
To see this requires a fuller analysis of the effect of learning.
Assume that Z permits learning and that another activity X does not
and has a flat earnings profile: Z might have the profile labeled TT
in Chart 1 (in Chapter II) and X that labeled UU. If TT were every-
where above UU—i.e., earnings in Z were greater than those in X at
each age—there would be a clear incentive for some persons to leave
X and enter Z. The result would be a lowering of TT and raising of
UU; generally the process would continue until TT was no longer
everywhere above UU, as in Chart 1. Earnings would now be lower
in Z than in X at younger ages and higher only later on, and workers
would have to decide whether the later higher earnings compensated
for the lower initial earnings.
They presumably would decide by comparing the present value of
earnings in Z and X, or, what is equivalent, by comparing the rate of
return that equates these present values with rates that could be
obtained elsewhere. They would choose Z if the present value were
greater there, or if the equalizing rate were greater than those else-
where. Therefore, they would choose Z only if the rate of return on
their learning were sufficiently great, that is, only if the returns from
learning—the higher earnings later on—offset the costs of learning—
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a future" and "dead-end" activities involves exactly the same consid-
erations as choosing between continuing one's education and entering
the labor force—whether returns in the form of higher subsequent
earnings sufficiently offset costs in the form of lower initial ones. Al-
though learning cannot be avoided once in activities like Z, it can
be avoided beforehand because workers can enter activities like X that
provide little or no learning. They or society would choose learning
only if it were a sufficiently good investment in the same way that
they or society would choose on-the-job training if it were sufficiently
profitable.
Consequently, the conclusion must be that learning is a way to in-
vest in human capital that is formally no different from education,
on-the-job training, or other recognized investments. So it is a virtue
rather than a defect of our formulation of costs and returns that
learning is treated symmetrically with other investments. And there is
no conflict between interpretations of the shape of earning profiles
based on learning theory
1
3 and those based on investment in human
capital because the former is a special case of the latter. Of course,
the fact that the physical and psychological factors associated with
learning theory
1
4 are capable of producing rather steep concave pro-
files, like TT and even T'T' in Chart 1, should make one hesitate in
relating them to education and other conventional investments. The
converse is also true, however: the fact that many investments in
human capital in a market economy would produce "the learning
curve" should make one hesitate in relating it to the various factors
associated with learning theory.
Another frequent criticism is that many on-the-job investments are
really free in that earnings are not reduced at any age. Although this
would be formally consistent with my analysis since the rate of return
need only be considered infinite (in Chart 1, TT would be nowhere
below UU), I suspect that a closer examination of the alleged "facts"
would usually reveal a much more conventional situation. For exam-
ple, if abler employees were put through executive training programs,
as is probable, they might earn no less than employees outside the
programs but they might earn less than if they had not been in train-
ing.
1
3 Again, the earnings of employees receiving specific training may
13 See, for example, J. Mincer, "Investment in Human Capital and Personal In-
come Distribution," Journal of Political Economy, August 1958, pp. 287-288.
14 See, for example, R. Bush and F. Mosteller, Stochastic Models for Learning,
New York, 1955.
15 Some indirect evidence is cited by J. Mincer in "On-the-job Training: Costs,
Returns, and Some Implications," Investment in Human Beings, NBER Special Con-
ference 15, supplement to Journal of Political Economy, October 1962, p. 53.EARNINGS, COSTS, AND RATES OF RETURN 69
not be reduced for the reasons presented in Chapter II. Finally, one
must have a very poor opinion of the ability of firms to look out for
their own interests to believe that infinite rates of return are of great
importance.
So much in defense of the approach. To estimate costs empirically
still requires a priori knowledge that nothing is invested in activity X.
Without such knowledge, only the difference between the amounts in-
vested in any two activities with known net earning streams could be
estimated from the definitions in equation (28). Were this done for
all available streams, the investment in any activity beyond that in
the activity with the smallest investment could be determined.
1
6 The
observed minimum investment would not be zero, however, if the rate
of return on some initial investment were sufficiently high to attract
everyone. A relevant question is, therefore: can the shape of the
stream in an activity with zero investment be specified a priori so that
the total investment in any activity can be determined?
The statement "nothing is invested in an activity" only means that
nothing was invested after the age when information on earnings first
became available; investment can have occurred before that age. If,
for example, the data begin at age eighteen, some investment in
schooling, health, or information surely must have occurred at younger
ages. The earning stream of persons who do not invest after age
eighteen would have to be considered, at least in part, as a return on
the investment before eighteeen. Indeed, in the developmental ap-
proach to child rearing, most if not all of these earnings would be so
considered.
The earning stream in an activity with no investment beyond the
initial age (activity X) would be flat if the developmental approach
were followed and earnings were said to result entirely from earlier
investment.
1
7 The incorporation of learning into the concept of in-
vestment in human capital also suggests that earnings profiles would
be flat were there no (additional) investment. Finally, the empirical
evidence, for what it is worth (see comments in Chapter VII), suggests
that earnings profiles in unskilled occupations are quite flat. If the
earnings profile in X were flat, the unobserved investment could easily
be determined in the usual way once an assumption were made about
its rate of return.
16 The technique has been applied and developed further by Mincer (ibid.).
17 If C measured the cost of investment before the initial age and r its rate of
return, k = rC would measure the return per period. If earnings were attributed
entirely to this investment, X( = k = rC, where X, represents earnings at the ith
period past the initial age.70 INVESTMENT IN HUMAN CAPITAL: RATES OF RETURN
The assumption that lifetimes are infinite, although descriptively
unrealistic, often yields results that are a close approximation to the
truth. For example, I show later (see Chapter VI, section 2) that the
average rate of return on college education in the United States would
be only slightly raised if people remained in the labor force indefi-
nitely. A finite earning period has, however, a greater effect on the rate
of return of investments made at later ages, say, after forty; indeed, it
helps explain why schooling and other investments are primarily made
at younger ages.
An analysis of finite earning streams can be approached in two
ways. One simply applies the concepts developed for infinite streams
and says there is disinvestment in human capital when net earnings
are above the amount that could be maintained indefinitely. Invest-
ment at younger ages would give way to disinvestment at older ages
until no human capital remained at death (or retirement). This ap-
proach has several important applications and is used in parts of the
study (see especially Chapter VII). An alternative that is more useful
for some purposes lets the earning period itself influence the defini-
tions of accrued income and cost. The income resulting from an in-
vestment during period / would be defined as
where n + 1 is the earning period, and the amount invested during
/ would be defined by
'g' '* (3,)
Addendum: The Allocation of Time and Goods over Time
Basic Model
This section discusses the allocation of time and goods over a lifetime
among three main sectors: consumption, investment in human capital,
and labor force participation. It uses the framework developed in my
"A Theory of the Allocation of Time," Economic Journal, September
1965. That paper, however, considered the allocation only at a mo-
ment of time among various kinds of consumption and time utiliza-
tions; this discussion generalizes the analysis to decisions over time and
to investment in human capital.THE ALLOCATION OF TIME AND GOODS OVER TIME 71
Assume that a person is certain' that he will live n periods. His
economic welfare depends on his consumption over time of objects of
choice called commodities, as in
U = U{C%, . . . C), (32)
where Ct is the amount of the commodity consumed during period i.
As assumed in the paper cited above, Ct is in turn produced "at home"
with inputs of his market goods and his own time. Let the (composite)
market goods used in period i be xu and the (composite) amount of
time combined with x{ be t,... Then
Ci = lf(xi, tCl), i = 1, . . .n (3?)
where ,-/ is the production function in period i. If initially it is as-
sumed that time can be allocated only between consumption and
labor force participation (called "work"), the following identity holds
in each period
tei + tw, = t, i = 1, . . . n (34)
where tu.. >'s the amount of work in i, and t, the total time available
during i, is independent of J if all periods are equally long.
The "endowment" in each period is not simply a fixed amount of
"income" since that is affected by the hours spent at work, which is a
decision variable. Instead it is the vector (wit fj), where vt is the amount
of property income and wt is the wage rate available in the i
th period.
Suppose that there is a perfect capital market with an interest rate,
r, the same in each period. Then a constraint on goods that comple-
ments the constraints on time given by (34) is that the present value
of expenditures on goods must equal the present value of incomes:
1
8
WjtWi -t- Vj (
is Savings in period i is denned as
Si — Witwi + Vi — piXi.
Our formulation is implicitly assuming that the savings process itself takes no
time; a somewhat weaker assumption, say that savings is less time-intensive than
consumption, would not result in greatly different conclusions. I. Ehrlich and U.
Ben-Zion have since analyzed the effect of time on savings in "A Theory of Pro-
ductive Savings," University of Chicago, 1972.72 INVESTMENT IN HUMAN CAPITAL: RATES OF RETURN
Substitution for tw. from equation (34) into (35) gives the set of
constraints
-^ piXi + WitCi *sry Wit + Vi
and
0 < tCi < t, Xi>0. i = 1, . . . n (37)
The term on the right equals "full wealth," which is an extension of the
definition of "full income" given in my earlier article. The term on the
left shows how this full wealth is "spent": either on goods or on the
foregone earnings associated with the use of time in consumption. Each
person (or family) is assumed to maximize his utility function given by
equation (32) subject to the constraints given by (36) and (37), and the
production functions given by (33). The decision variables are the tc
and Xj, 2n variables. If the optimal values of these variables are as-
sumed to be in the interior of the regions given by (37), and if the






 tJt " dtc;
 Ut " act
and A is a Lagrangian multiplier equal to the marginal utility of
wealth.
Dividing equation (39) by (38) gives
(40)
or in each period the marginal product of consumption time relative
to goods equals the real wage rate in the same period, and is in-
dependent of the interest rate. In other words, consumption time
should have a relatively high marginal product when the real wage
rate is relatively high.THE ALLOCATION OF TIME AND GOODS OVER TIME 73
To understand the implications of equation (40) somewhat better,
assume that all J are homogeneous of the first degree, which is a
fairly innocuous assumption in the present context. Let us also
temporarily assume that the productivity of goods and consumption
time do not vary with age, so that /'s are the same. Since the marginal
productivities of linear homogeneous production functions depend
only on factor proportions, equation (40) implies, if marginal products
are declining, with these additional assumptions that the production
of commodities is relatively time-intensive when real wages are rela-
tively low, and relatively goods-intensive when real wages are relatively
high.
Note that this last result is a "substitution" effect and is unam-
biguous: it is not offset by any "income" effect that operates in the
opposite direction. There is no offsetting income or wealth effect be-
cause "full" wealth is fixed, by the right-hand side of equation (36), and
is completely independent of the allocation of time and goods over
time or at a moment in time. Note, however, that this "substitution"
effect is in terms of the relative time or goods intensities in different
periods, and not in terms of the absolute amount of consumption time
(sometimes called "leisure") in different periods. The latter cannot
be determined from equation (40) alone, and depends on the alloca-
tion of commodities over time. Only if the consumption of commodities
were the same at all periods would relative and absolute intensities
necessarily move in the same direction.
To see what happens to commodity consumption over time, con-
sider an alternative form of equation (38):
|£=£&(l+r)«-«. i,j=\,...n (41) ui PJ
If prices are assumed to be stable, pi — pj—\ and equation (41) becomes
^ = £i(l+r)O-<>. (42)
It has been shown that tCi/xt > tc./Xj if Wj > a/*. It follows from the
assumptions of homogeneity and diminishing returns that fx. > fx.
Hence from (42)
Jf^tt +r)«-» as wi^wj. (43)
Note that equality of the left- and right-hand sides, which is un-74 INVESTMENT IN HUMAN CAPITAL: RATES OF RETURN
doubtedly the most famous equilibrium condition in the allocation of
consumption over time,
1
9 holds if, and only if, the wage rates are the





Consider the implications of (43) for the optimal consumption path
over time. I assume neutral time preference in the weak sense that all
the Ui would be the same if all the C( were the same. Then if equality
held in (43), all the Ct would be the same if r = 0, and would tend to
rise over time (ignoring differential wealth effects) if r > 0. Equality
holds, however, only if the wt were the same in all periods. But actual
wage rates tend to rise with age until the mid-forties, fifties, or sixties,
and then begin to decline. With that pattern for the wit (43) implies
that if r = 0, the Ct would not be stationary, but would tend to decline
with age until the peak wt was reached, and then would tend to rise as
the Wi fell (see Chart 2).
2
0
The rate of fall and then rise of the Ct depends, of course, on the
elasticities of substitution in consumption. In addition, the initial de-
cline in Ci would be shorter and less steep and the subsequent rise
would be longer, the larger r was (see Chart 2); for sufficiently large
r, Ci might rise throughout.
Since —, the ratio of consumption time to goods, would fall as the
X
wage rate rose, and rise as it fell (see Chart 3), if C{ were constant, the
absolute value of tc would have the same pattern as this ratio. A fortiori,
if r = 0, and if C{ declined as wt rose and rose as Wi fell (see Chart 2),
tc would fall as w{ rose and rise as it fell (see Chart 3). If r > 0, Ct
declines more briefly and less rapidly than when r = 0, and conse-
quently, so would tc; in particular, tc would*reach a minimum before
Wi reached a maximum. Put differently, hours of work, tw, would
reach a maximum before the wage rate did. The difference between
the peaks in tw and w would be positively related to the size of r,
and the elasticities of substitution between different C% and C,. House-
holds faced with high interest rates, for example, should hit their peak
hours of work earlier than otherwise similar households with low in-
terest rates.
19 Its derivation is presumably due to I. Fisher (see The Theory of Interest, New
York, 1965, Chapters XII and XIII); it is also used in countless other studies: see,
for example, Jf. Henderson and R. Quandt, Microeconomics: A Mathematical Ap-
proach, New York, 1971.
201 say "tend to" because of possible differential degrees of substitution be-
tween consumption in different periods. For example, high consumption in period
/ might so raise the marginal utility of consumption in period k as to cause the
equilibrium value of Ck to exceed Ct, even though w} < wt. If the utility function is fully separable, this cannot occur.THE ALLOCATION OF TIME AND GOODS OVER TIME 75
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It may appear that the Fisherian equality has simply been hidden
and not replaced by the concentration on C instead of x. Indeed, equa-
tion (42) does imply a kind of Fisherian equality if the / terms are
transposed to the left side to yield
(44)
MUX UJXi
The term UJXi is the marginal utility of an additional unit of xu
and similarly for the / term. Equation (44) would seem to imply a hori-
zontal path of the xt if r = 0 and if time preference were neutral, the
Fisherian result.
However plausible, this conclusion does not follow, and the Fisherian
result cannot be saved. This is partly because the utility function de-
pends directly on C and only indirectly on x, and partly because the
path of x is also dependent on the production function /. If r = 0 and
U implied neutral time preference with respect to the C, then the
movement in C would tend to be inversely, and that in x/tc directly,76 INVESTMENT IN HUMAN CAPITAL: RATES OF RETURN
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related to the movement in w. The size of these respective movements
depends on the elasticities of substitution between the C in U, and
between x and tc in /. The movement in C tends to make x inversely
related to the movement in w, whereas that in x/tc makes it directly
related.
The actual movement in x, therefore, is determined by the relative
strength of these opposing forces, that is, by the relative size of the
elasticities of substitution in consumption and in production. The
larger the latter elasticity, the more likely that x is directly related to
w. Only if the elasticities were identical would the two substitutions
offset each other, and would x be stationary with r — 0.
2
1 Of course, x
(and C) are more likely to rise over time the higher r is.
Note that a rise in the consumption of goods with age, which is
21 For further developments, see G. Ghez, A Theory of Life Cycle Consumption,
Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1970, and G. Ghez and G. Becker, The
Allocation of Time and Goods over the Life Cycle, New York, NBER, 1975.THE ALLOCATION OF TIME AND GOODS OVER TIME 77
frequently observed at least until age forty-five, can be explained with-
out recourse to assumptions about time preference for the future,
elastic responses to interest rate changes, or underestimation of future
incomes. Neutral time preference, negligible interest rate responses,
and perfect anticipation of the future could all be assumed if there
were sufficiently easy substitution between time and goods in the
production of commodities. The time path of goods consumption is
not, however, a reliable guide to the path of true consumption (that
is, of commodities) since the latter could well be inversely correlated
with the former.
Investment in Human Capital
Instead of assuming that time can be allocated only between market
labor force activity and nonmarket consumption activity, I now in-
troduce a third category, investment in human capital. For the present
an increased amount of human capital, measured by E, is assumed to
affect only wage rates. Each person produces his own human capital by
using some of his time and goods to attend "school," receive on-the-job
training, etc. The rate of change in his capital equals the difference





0* = Htei, JO, (45)
where fa is the output of human capital in the i
th period, and te. and
xei are the time and goods inputs, respectively. Then
Ei+1 = Ei + 4n - dEh (46)
where Ei+1 is the stock at the beginning of the i + 1 period, and d
is the rate of depreciation during a period. Each household maximizes
the utility function in (32), subject to the production constraints in
22 This model of human capital accumulation is very similar to and much in-
fluenced by that found in Y. Ben-Porath, "The Production of Human Capital and
the Life Cycle of Earnings," Journal of Political Economy, August 1967, or in the
addendum to this volume "Human Capital and the Personal Distribution of In-
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(33), (45), and (46), and to the following time and goods "budget"
constraints
tCi + tWi + te,• = t, i = 1, . . . n (47)
E
Xj + Xei ^ OtiEitWi + Vj
where if* = «;£; and tti is the payment per unit of human capital in
period i. If, for simplicity, one assumes that <j>t depends only on te.
and that ^ is the same in all periods, and if the optimal solution has
nonzero values of xit tc., tw., and te., the first order optimality conditions are
=
 x(TT7p «-i,...* (49)
-l,...n (50)
Equations (49) and (50) are essentially the same as (38) and (39).
Therefore, investment in human capital, under the present assump-
tions, does not basically change the implications derived so far. For
example, the time spent in consuming, tc, would still tend to decline
with age, reach a trough before the peak wage rate age, and then in-
crease, and the time path of goods would still depend on the interest
rate, and the elasticities of substitution in consumption and production.
Two significant differences are, first, that the path of the wage rate is
no longer given, but is determined by the path of the endogenous
variable E{. The wage rate would reach a peak before, at, or after the
peak in ai as Ei peaked before, at, or after a*. Second, the behavior of
tw is no longer simply the complement of the behavior of tc, since tw
also depends on te, which is determined by equation (51).
Equation (51) expresses the well-known equilibrium condition that
the present value of the marginal cost of investing in human capital
equals the present value of future returns. This equation clearly shows
that the amount of time spent investing in human capital would tend
to decline with age for two reasons. One is that the number of remain-
ing periods, and thus the present value of future returns, would de-THE ALLOCATION OF TIME AND GOODS OVER TIME 79
cline with age. The other is that the cost of investment would tend to
rise with age as Et rose because foregone earnings would rise
Several interesting consequences follow from the tendency for te. to
fall as i increases. One is that hours of work, tw, would be lower at
younger ages and rise more rapidly than if there were no investment
in human capital. Consequently, as long as te. was positive, the peak
in tw would tend to come after the trough in tc, and might even also
come after the peak in wt. However, since te declines with age, if it
became sufficiently small by some age p before n, then for i > p, the
behavior of tw would be approximately the complement of the be-
havior of tc.
If so much time at younger ages were put into investment in human
capital that no time remained to allocate to work (tw = 0), tc and te
would be complements at these ages. Marginal investment costs would
not be measured by foregone earnings, but by the marginal value of
time used in consumption, which would exceed foregone earnings
(otherwise tw > 0).
If tw. = 0, i: = 1, . . . q, instead of equations (49) to (51), the first








Uiju = Si i=l,...q (53)
where ^ is the marginal utility of an additional hour of time spent at
consumption in the i
tb period. If UJt. is substituted for ^ in equation
(54),
or the present value of the returns from an additional hour spent in-
vesting would equal not foregone earnings but the money equivalent of
the marginal utility from an additional hour spent in consumption.
When equation (53) is divided by (52), and a substitution for ^ is
made from (54), one has
Jx= E (i+'r)»-iff» i = l...f (56)80 INVESTMENT IN HUMAN CAPITAL: RATES OF RETURN
the ratio of the marginal products of time and goods is not equated to
the wage rate since no time is spent working, but to the monetary
value of the marginal productivity of time used in investing. Even if
Wi for i < q were small, therefore, the production of commodities
would be goods-intensive if the return to investment time were high.
Age and the Production Functions
By assuming that the production functions for commodities and hu-
man capital are the same at all ages, I have been able to analyze the
different time and goods combinations at different ages in terms of
differences in real wage rates and returns alone. Yet presumably as a
person gains (or loses) experience, knowledge, and strength with age,
the production possibilities available to him also change. This section
analyzes the consequences of such changes for the optimal allocation of
goods and time.
Let us concentrate on changes in the production functions for com-
modities, and assume that productive efficiency rises with age until a
peak efficiency is reached, and then declines until age n. If the changes
in efficiency were factor neutral, the production functions could be
written as
if = giftov, xd, (57)






equation (50) would become
= ^ T\ i \V (59)
while equation (51) would be unaffected.
If equation (58) is divided by (59), the efficiency coefficients g4 drop
out, and the optimal combination of time and goods depends, as be-
fore, only on the shape of / and a^. Therefore, goods intensity rises
until a peak is reached at the peak wage age, and then falls, and does
not at all depend on the path of the 5f.
If r = 0 and w were rising with age, the decline in C with age would
be greater than when production functions did not change if produc-
tive efficiency (measured by g) were falling with age because theTHE ALLOCATION OF TIME AND GOODS OVER TIME 81
marginal cost of producing C would rise faster with age; conversely
if g were rising with age. The effect on the x and tc is less definite and
depends also on the elasticity of substitution in consumption because
changes in the efficiency of producing C—the use of x and tc per unit
of C—can offset the change in C. If this elasticity exceeded unity,
changes in efficiency would change x and tc in the same direction as it
changes C.
If changes in efficiency were not factor neutral but, say, changed the
marginal product of consumption time more than that of goods
("goods-saving" change), there would be less incentive to substitute
goods for time as wages rose if efficiency also rose. Therefore, produc-
tion would not become as goods-intensive when wages and efficiency
were rising, or as time-intensive when they were both falling. The
converse would hold, of course, if changes in efficiency changed the
marginal product of goods more than time.
Human Capital and Consumption
So far I have assumed that an increase in human capital directly only
changes the productivity of time in the marketplace. Human capital
might, however, also change the productivity of time and goods used
in producing household consumption or in producing additional hu-
man capital itself.
Studies of investment in education and other human capital have
been repeatedly criticized for ignoring the consumption aspects, al-
though critics have been no more successful than others in treating
these aspects in a meaningful way. One approach is to permit human
capital to enter utility functions, but given the difficulties in measuring,
quantifying, and comparing utilities, this does not seem too promising.




Ci = ;/(*;, tCi; EJ. (60)
The marginal effect* of human capital on consumption in the i
tb
period can be defined as the marginal product or "shift" of Ct with
respect to Et:
- i - m - <
23 This approach is treated in considerable detail, both theoretically and em-
pirically, by R. Michael, The Effect of Education on Efficiency in Consumption,
New York, NBER, 1972, an outgrowth of a 1969 Ph.D. dissertation at Columbia.82 INVESTMENT IN HUMAN CAPITAL: RATES OF RETURN
The optimal allocation of time and goods can still be found by dif-
ferentiating the utility function subject to the production functions and
budget constraints. Equilibrium conditions (49) and (50) or (52) and
(53) would be formally unaffected by the inclusion of E in the produc-
tion of commodities. The equilibrium conditions with respect to te,
the time spent investing in human capital, would, however, change
from equation (51) to
TTf






(1 + rY -^ X
 /e' dtei
 + j^l (1 + r)i dtei
A similar change would be produced in equation (54).
The term on the left-hand side of equation (63) is the present value
of foregone earnings in period i—the cost of using more time in period
i to produce human capital—and the terms on the right give the
present value of the benefits. The second term on the right is the
familiar present value of monetary returns, and gives the increase in
wealth resulting from an additional investment in human capital in
period i. The first term on the right is less familiar and measures the
effect of additional investment on consumption. It essentially measures
the present value of the reduction in goods and time required to
produce a given basket of commodities resulting from increased in-
vestment in period e.
2
4










hi = 7xi(fxt*i) + Ziftitci). (40
Substituting from the equilibrium conditions (49) and (50) for fXi and /t, yields
f - (T
 Xi I T
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Treated in this way, the effect of human capital on consumption be-
comes symmetrical to its effect on investment: the latter gives the
monetary value of the stream of increased incomes, whereas the
former gives the monetary value of the stream of reduced costs.
A few implications of the inclusion of the consumption effects of
human capital can be noted briefly. Since they clearly raise the total
benefits from investment, more time at each age would be spent in-
vesting than if these effects were nil. This in turn implies a greater
likelihood of "corner" solutions, especially at younger ages, with the
equilibrium conditions given by equations (52), (53), and an extension
of (54)
2
5 being relevant. Moreover, there would now be justification for
an assumption that efficiency in consumption and wage rates rise and
fall together, because they would be the joint results of changes in the
stock of human capital.
Some Extensions of the Analysis
It is neither realistic nor necessary to assume that wage rates are given,
aside from the effects of human capital. The average wage rate and the
number of hours a person works are generally related because of
fatigue, differences between part-time and full-time opportunities,
and thus
The terms fXi and /<, equal the percentage reductions in goods and time respectively
in period i required to produce a given C, resulting from the "shift" in / caused by a
unit increase in Ei. Hence, the full term on the right-hand side of (6') gives the present
value of the savings in goods and time in period i required to achieve a given amount
of Ci. Consequently,
V* Ulf
 dJ± = V* /*.*> , fu<*i
Eitci dEj
gives the full present value of the savings in goods and time resulting from addi-
tional investment in human capital in period i.
25 With consumption effects, equation (54) is replaced by
(54
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fixed costs of working, overtime provisions, and so forth. Our analysis
can easily incorporate an effect of tw on w, as in
Wi = Wi(tWi), (64)
or even more generally in
u>i = Wi(tWi, /„,,._„ . . . O (65)
if on-the-job learning is to be analyzed separately from other human
capital. Marginal, not average, wage rates are the relevant measures
of the cost of time and would enter the equilibrium conditions.
2
0
It would also be more realistic to consider several commodities at
any moment in time, each having its own production function and
goods and time inputs. This could easily be done by introducing the
utility function
U = U(CU, . . . Cln, C2/, . . . C8B, • • • Cml, . . . Cmn), (66)
where C, is the amount of the /
t
h commodity consumed in the t
t
h
period. This function would be maximized subject to separate produc-
tion functions for each commodity (and perhaps in each period) and
to the budget constraints. One of the main implications is that when
wage rates are relatively high, not only is the production of each com-
modity relatively goods-intensive, but consumption shifts toward
relatively goods-intensive commodities and away from time-intensive
commodities. The latter (such as children or grandchildren) would be
consumed more at younger and older ages if wage rates or more
generally the cost of time rose at younger ages and fell eventually; con-
versely, goods-intensive commodities would be consumed more at
middle ages. These age patterns in the consumption of time and goods-
intensive commodities strengthen the tendency for consumption time
to fall initially and for goods to rise initially with age.
The accumulation of human capital might also "shift" the produc-
tion function used to produce human capital itself since investors with
much human capital might well be more productive than those with
little. This has been discussed elsewhere,
2
7 and I only mention here






27 See Ben-Porath, op. cit., and addendum to this volume "Human Capital and
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one implication. The tendency for the amount invested to decline
with age would be somewhat retarded because investment would be
encouraged as capital was accumulated, since time would become more
productive and this would offset the effect of its becoming more costly.
The allocation over a lifetime should be put in a family context,
with the decisions of husbands, wives, and possibly also children in-
teracting with each other. For example, if wives' wage rates are more
stationary than their husbands', the analysis in this paper predicts that
the labor force participation of married women would be relatively
high at younger and older ages, and relatively low at middle ages,
precisely what is observed. A similar result would follow if the
productivity in consumption of married women's time is higher at
middle ages because child rearing is time-intensive. The analysis de-
veloped here seems capable of throwing considerable light on the





Some implications of this model have been tested by the author with
data from the 1960 Census 1/1000 sample giving earnings, hours, and
weeks worked, cross-classified by age, sex, race, and education.
2
9
2. The Incentive to Invest
Number of Periods
Economists have long believed that the incentive to expand and im-
prove physical resources depends on the rate of return expected. They
have been very reluctant, however, to interpret improvements in the
effectiveness and amount of human resources in the same way, namely,
as systematic responses or "investments" resulting in good part from
the returns expected. In this section and the next one, I try to show
that an investment approach to human resources is a powerful and
simple tool capable of explaining a wide range of phenomena, in-
28 This has been confirmed in several studies since this was written; see A.
Leibowitz, "Women's Allocation of Time to Market and Non-Market Activities,"
Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1972; or H. Ofek, "Allocation of Goods and
Time in a Family Context," Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1971; or
J. Smith, "A Life Cycle Family Model, NBER Working Paper 5, 1973.
2» The results are published in Ghez and Becker, op. cit., Chapter 3.86 INVESTMENT IN HUMAN CAPITAL: RATES OF RETURN
eluding much that has been either ignored or given ad hoc interpre-
tations. The discussion covers many topics, starting with the life span
of activities and ending with a theory of the distribution of earnings.
An increase in the life span of an activity would, other things being
equal, increase the rate of return on the investment made in any
period. The influence of life span on the rate of return and thus on
the incentive to invest is important and takes many forms, a few of
which will now be discussed.
The number of periods is clearly affected by mortality and morbidity
rates; the lower they are, the longer is the expected life span and the
larger is the fraction of a lifetime that can be spent at any activity.
The major secular decline of these rates in the United States and
elsewhere probably increased the rates of return on investment in
human capital,
3
0 thereby encouraging such investment.
3
1 This con-
clusion is independent of whether the secular improvement in health
itself resulted from investment; if so, the secular increase in rates of
return would be part of the return to the investment in health.
A relatively large fraction of younger persons are in school or on-
the-job training, change jobs and locations, and add to their knowl-
edge of economic, political, and social opportunities. The main ex-
planation may not be that the young are relatively more interested
in learning, able to absorb new ideas, less tied down by family re-
sponsibilities, more easily supported by parents, or more flexible about
changing their routine and place of living. One need not rely only on
life-cycle effects on capabilities, responsibilities, or attitudes as soon as
one recognizes that schooling, training, mobility, and the like are ways
to invest in human capital and that younger people have a greater
incentive to invest because they can collect the return over more years.
Indeed, there would be a greater incentive even if age had no effect
on capabilities, responsibilities, and attitudes.
The ability to collect returns over more years would give young
30 I say probably because rates of return are adversely affected (via the effects on
marginal productivity) by the increase in labor force that would result from a de-
cline in death and sickness. If the adverse effect were sufficiently great, their decline
would reduce rates of return on human capital. I am indebted to my wife for em-
phasizing this point.
31 The relation between investment in training and length of life is apparently
even found in the training of animals, as evidenced by this statement from a book
I read to my children: "Working elephants go through a long period of schooling.
Training requires about ten years and costs nearly five thousand dollars. In view of
the animal's long life of usefulness [they usually live more than sixty years], this is
not considered too great an investment" (M. H. Wilson, Animals of the World, New
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persons a much greater incentive to invest even if the internal rate of
return did not decline much with age. The intern?
1 rate can be seri-
ously misleading here, as the following example indicates. If $109
invested at any age yielded $10 a year additional income forever, the
rate of return would be 10 per cent at every age, and there would be
no special incentive to invest at younger ages if only the rate of return
were taken into account. Consider, however, a cohort of persons aged
eighteen deciding when to Invest. If the rate of return elsewhere were
5 per cent and if they invested immediately, the present value of the
gain would he $100. If they waited five years, the present value of the
gain, i.e., as of age eighteen, would only be about $78, or 22 per cent
less; if they waited ten years, the present value of the gain would be
under $50, or less than half. Accordingly, a considerable incentive
would exist for everyone to invest immediately rather than waiting.
In less extreme examples some persons might wait until older ages,
but the number investing would tend to decline rapidly with age even
if the rate of return did not.
3
2
Although the unification of these different kinds of behavior by the
investment approach is important evidence in its favor, other evidence
is needed. A powerful test can be developed along the following
lines.
3
3 Suppose that investment in human capital raised earnings for
p periods only, where p varied between 0 and n. The size of p would
be affected by many factors, including the rate of obsolescence since
the more rapidly an investment became obsolete the smaller p would
be. The advantage in being young would be less the smaller p was,
since the effect of age on the rate of return would be positively re-
lated to p. For example, if p equaled two years, the rate would be the
same at all ages except the two nearest the "retirement" age. If the
investment approach were correct, the difference between the amount
32 One clear application of these considerations can be found in studies of migra-
tion, where some writers have rejected the importance cf the period of returns be-
cause migration rates decline strongly with age, at least initially, while rates of
return (or some equivalent) decline slowly (see the otherwise fine paper by L.
Sjaastad, "The Costs and Returns of Human Migration," Investment in Human
Beings, pp. 89-90). My analysis suggests, however, that persons with a clear gain
from migration have a strong incentive to migrate early and not wait even a few
years. Since the persons remaining presumably have either no incentive or little in-
centive to migrate, it is not surprising that their migration rates should be much
lower than tnat of all persons.
33 This test was suggested by George Stigler's discussion of the effect of different
autocorrelation patterns on the incentive to invest in information (see "The
Economics of Information," Journal of Political Economy, June 1961, and "Informa-
tion in the Labor Market," Investment in Human Beings, pp. 94-105).80 INVESTMENT IN HUMAN CAPITAL: RATES OF RETURN
invested at different ages would be positively correlated with p, which
is not surprising since an expenditure with a small p would be less of
an "investment" than one with a large p, and arguments based on an
investment framework would be less applicable. None of the life-cycle
arguments seem to imply any correlation with p, so this provides a
powerful test of the importance of the investment approach.
The time spent in any one activity is determined not only by age,
mortality, and morbidity but also by the amount of switching between
activities. Women spend less time in the labor force than men and,
therefore, have less incentive to invest in market skills; tourists spend
little time in any one area and have less incentive than residents of
the area to invest in knowledge of specific consumption opportuni-
ties;
3
4 temporary migrants to urban areas have less incentive to invest
in urban skills than permanent residents; and, as a final example,
draftees have less incentive than professional soldiers to invest in
purely military skills.
Women, tourists, and the like have to find investments that increase
productivity in several activities. A woman wants her investment to
be useful both in her roles as a housewife and as a participant in the
labor force, or a frequent traveler wants to be knowledgeable in many
environments. Such investments would be less readily available than
more specialized ones—after all, an investment increasing productivity
in two activities also increases it in either one alone, extreme com-
plementarity aside, while the converse does not hold; specialists,
therefore, have greater incentive to invest in themselves than others do.
Specialization in an activity would be discouraged if the market
were very limited; thus the incentive to specialize and to invest in
oneself would increase as the extent of the market increased. Workers
would be more skilled the larger the market, not only because "prac-
tice makes perfect," which is so often stressed in discussions of the
division of labor,
3
5 but also because a larger market would induce a
greater investment in skills.
3
6 Put differently, the usual analysis of the
division of labor stresses that efficiency, and thus wage rates, would be
34 This example is from Stigler, "The Economics of Information," Journal of
Political Economy, June 1961.
35 See, for example, A. Marshall, Principles of Economics, New York, 1949, Book
IV, Chapter ix.
36 If "practice makes perfect" means that age-earnings profiles slope upward, then
according to my approach it must be treated along with other kinds of learning as a
way of investing in human capital, The above distinction between the effect of an
increase in the market on practice and on the incentive to invest would then simply
be that the incentive to invest in human capital is increased even aside from the
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greater the larger the market, and ignores the potential earnings
period in any activity, while rnine stresses that this period, and thus
the incentive to become more "efficient," would be directly related to
market size. Surprisingly little attention has been paid to the latter,
that is, to the influence of market size on the incentive to invest in
skills.
Wage Differentials and Secular Changes
According to equation (30), the internal rate of return depends on the
ratio of the return per unit of time to investment costs. A change in
the return and costs by the same percentage would not change the
internal rate, while a greater percentage change in the return would
change the internal rate in the same direction. The return is meas-
ured by the absolute income gain, or by the absolute income differ-
ence between persons differing only in the amount of their investment.
Note that absolute, not relative, income differences determine the
return and the internal rate.
Occupational and educational wage differentials are sometimes
measured by relative, sometimes by absolute, wage differences,
3
7 al-
though no one has adequately discussed their relative merits. Since
marginal productivity analysis relates the derived demand for any
class of workers to the ratio of their wages to those of other inputs,
3
8
wage ratios are more appropriate in understanding forces determining
demand. They are not, however, the best measure of forces determin-
ing supply, for the return on investment in skills and other knowl-
edge is determined by absolute wage differences. Therefore neither
wage ratios nor wage differences are uniformly the best measure, ratios
being more appropriate in demand studies and differences in supply
studies.
The importance of distinguishing between wage ratios and dif-
ferences, and the confusion resulting from the practice of using ratios
37 See A. M. Ross and W. Goldner, "Forces Affecting the Interindustry Wage Struc-
ture," Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1950; P. H. Bell, "Cyclical Variations
and Trend in Occupational Wage Differentials in American Industry since 1914,"
Review of Economics and Statistics, November 1951; F. Meyers and R. L. Bowlby,
"The Interindustry Wage Structure and Productivity," Industrial and Labor Rela-
tions Review, October 1953; G. Stigler and D. Blank, The Demand and Supply of
Scientific Personnel, New York, NBER, 1957, Table 11; P. Keat, "Long-Run Changes
in Occupational Wage Structure, 1900-1956," Journal of Political Economy, Decem-
ber 1960.
38 Thus the elasticity of substitution is usually denned as the percentage change
in the ratio of quantities employed per 1 per cent change in the ratio of wages.90 INVESTMENT IN HUMAN CAPITAL: RATES OF RETURN
to measure supply as well as demand forces, can be illustrated by con-
sidering the effects of technological progress. If progress were uniform
in all industries and neutral with respect to all factors, and if there
were constant costs, initially all wages would rise by the same pro-
portion and the prices of all goods, including the output of indus-
tries supplying the investment in human capital,
3
9 would be un-
changed. Since wage ratios would be unchanged, firms would have no
incentive initially to alter their factor proportions. Wage differences,
on the other hand, would rise at the same rate- as wages, and since
investment costs would be unchanged, there would be an incentive to
invest more in human capital, and thus to increase the relative supply
of skilled persons. The increased supply would in turn reduce the
rate of increase of wage differences and produce an absolute narrow-
ing of wage ratios.
In the United States during much of the last eighty years, a narrow-
ing of wage ratios has gone hand in hand with an increasing relative
supply of skill, an association that is usually said to result from the
effect of an autonomous increase in the supply of skills—brought about
by the spread of free education or the rise in incomes—on the return
to skill, as measured by wage ratios. An alternative interpretation
suggested by the analysis here is that the spread of education and the
increased investment in other kinds of human capital were in large
part induced by technological progress (and perhaps other changes)
through the effect on the rate of return, as measured by wage differ-
ences and costs. Clearly a secular decline in wage ratios would not be
inconsistent with a secular increase in real wage differences if average
wages were rising, and, indeed, one important body of data on wages
shows a decline in ratios and an even stronger rise in differences.
4
0
The interpretation based on autonomous supply shifts has been
favored partly because a decline in wage ratios has erroneously been
taken as evidence of a decline in the return to skill. While a decision
ultimately can be based only on a detailed reexamination of the evi-
39 Some persons have argued that only direct investment costs would be un-
changed, indirect costs or foregone earnings rising along with wages. Neutral
progress implies, however, the same increase in the productivity of a student's time
as in his teacher's time or in the use of raw materials, so even foregone earnings
would not change.
40 Keat's data for 1906 and 1953 in the United States show both an average annual
decline of 0.8 per cent in the coefficient of variation of wages and an average annual
rise of 1.2 per cent in the real standard deviation. The decline in the coefficient of
variation was shown in his study (ibid.); I computed the change in the real standard
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dence,
4
1 the induced approach can be made more plausible by con-
sidering trends in physical capital. Economists have been aware that
the rate of return on capital could be rising or at least not falling
while the ratio of the "rental" price of capital to wages was falling.
Consequently, although the rental price of capital declined relative
to wages over time, the large secular increase in the amount of physi-
cal capital per man-hour is not usually considered autonomous, but
rather induced by technological and other developments that, at least
temporarily, raised the return. A common explanation based on the
effects of economic progress may, then, account for the increase in




An informed, rational person would invest only if the expected rate
of return were greater than the sum of the interest rate on riskless
assets and the liquidity and risk premiums associated with the invest-
ment. Not much need be said about the "pure" interest rate, but a
few words are in order on risk and liquidity. Since human capital is
a very illiquid asset—it cannot be sold and is rather poor collateral on
loans—a positive liquidity premium, perhaps a sizable one, would be
associated with such capital.
The actual return on human capital varies around the expected
return because of uncertainty about several factors. There has always
been considerable uncertainty about the length of life, one important
determinant of the return. People are also uncertain about their
ability, especially younger persons who do most of the investing. In
addition, there is uncertainty about the return to a person of given
age and ability because of numerous events that are not predictable.
The long time required to collect the return on an investment in
human capital reduces the knowledge available, for knowledge re-
41 For those believing that the qualitative evidence overwhelmingly indicates a
continuous secular decline in rates of return on human capital, I reproduce Adam
Smith's statement on earnings in some professions. "The lottery of the law, there-
fore, is very far from being a perfectly fair lottery; and that, as well as many other
liberal and honourable professions, is, in point of pecuniary gain, evidently under-
recompensed" (The Wealth of Nations, Modern Library edition, New York, 1937, p.
106). Since economists tend to believe that law and most other liberal professions are
now overcompensated relative to nonprofessional work "in point of pecuniary gain,"
the return to professional work could not have declined continuously if Smith's ob-
servations were accurate.
42 Some quantitative evidence for the United States is discussed in Chapter VI,
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quired is about the environment when the return is to be received,
and the longer the average period between investment and return, the
less such knowledge is available.
Informed observation as well as calculations I have made suggest
that there is much uncertainty about the return to human capital.
4
3
The response to uncertainty is determined by its amount and nature
and by tastes or attitudes. Many have argued that attitudes of inves-
tors in human capital are very different from those of investors in
physical capital because the former tend to be younger,
4
4 and young
persons are supposed to be especially prone to overestimate their
ability and chance of good fortune.
4
5 Were this view correct, a human
investment that promised a large return to exceptionally able or
lucky persons would be more attractive than a similar physical invest-
ment. However, a "life-cycle" explanation of attitudes toward risk
may be no more valid or necessary than life-cycle explanations of why
investors in human capital are relatively young (discussed above).




Capital Markets and Knowledge
If investment decisions responded only to earning prospects, adjusted
for risk and liquidity, the adjusted marginal rate of return would be
the same on all investments. The rate of return on education, train-
ing, migration, health, and other human capital is supposed to be
higher than on nonhuman capital, however, because of financing diffi-
43 For example, Marshall said: "Not much less than a generation elapses between
the choice by parents of a skilled trade for one of their children, and his reaping the
full results of their choice. And meanwhile the character of the trade may have been
almost revolutionized by changes, on which some probably threw long shadows be-
fore them, but others were such as could not have been foreseen even by the
shrewdest persons and those best acquainted with the circumstances of the trade" and
"the circumstances by which the earnings are determined are less capable of being
foreseen [than those for machinery]" (Principles of Economics, p. 571). In section 4
of Chapter IV some quantitative estimates of the uncertainty in the return to edu-
cation are presented.
44 Note that our argument above implied that investors in human capital would
be younger.
45 Smith said: "The contempt of risk and the presumptuous hope of success are
in no period of life more active than at the age at which young people choose their
professions" (Wealth of Nations, p. 109). Marshall said that "young men of an
adventurous disposition are more attracted by the prospects of a great success than
they are deterred by the fear of failure" (Principles of Economics, p. 554).
46 See M. Friedman and L. J. Savage, "The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving
Risks," reprinted in Readings in Price Theory, G. J. Stigler and K. Boulding, eds.,
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culties and inadequate knowledge of opportunities. These will now
be discussed briefly.
Economists have long emphasized that it is difficult to borrow funds
to invest in human capital because such capital cannot be offered as
collateral, and courts have frowned on contracts that even indirectly
suggest involuntary servitude. This argument has been explicitly used
to explain the "apparent" underinvestment in education and training
and also, although somewhat less explicitly, underinvestment in health,
migration, and other human capital. The importance attached to
capital market difficulties can be determined not only from the dis-
cussions of investment but also from the discussions of consump-
tion. Young persons would consume relatively little, productivity and
wages might be related, and some other consumption patterns would
follow only if it were difficult to capitalize future earning power. In-
deed, unless capital limitations applied to consumption as well as




Some other implications of capital market difficulties can also be
mentioned:
1. Since large expenditures would be more difficult to finance, in-
vestment in, say, a college education would be more affected than in,
say, short-term migration.
2. Internal financing would be common, and consequently wealth-
ier families would tend to invest more than poorer ones.
3. Since employees' specific skills are part of the intangible assets
or good will of firms and can be offered as collateral along with
tangible assets, capital would be more readily available for specific
than for general investments.
4. Some persons have argued that opportunity costs (foregone earn-
ings) are more readily financed than direct costs because they require
only to do "without," while the latter require outlays. Although
superficially plausible, this view can easily be shown to be wrong:
opportunity and direct costs can be financed equally readily, given the
state of the capital market. If total investment costs were $800, po-
tential earnings $1000, and if all costs were foregone earnings, investors
would have $200 of earnings to spend; if all were direct costs, they
would initially have $1000 to spend, but just $200 would remain after
47 A person with an income of X and investment costs of Y (Y < X) could either
use X for consumption and receive an investment loan of Y, or use X — Y for con-
sumption, y for investment, and receive a consumption loan of Y. He ends up with
the same consumption and investment in both cases, the only difference being in
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paying "tuition," so their net position would be exactly the same as
before. The example can be readily generalized and the obvious in-
ference is that indirect and direct investment costs are equivalent in
imperfect as well as perfect capital markets.
While it is undeniably difficult to use the capital market to finance
investments in human capital, there is some reason to doubt whether
otherwise equivalent investments in physical capital can be financed
much more easily. Consider an eighteen-year-old who wants to invest
a given amount in equipment for a firm he is starting rather than in
a college education. What is his chance of borrowing the whole
amount at a "moderate" interest rate? Very slight, I believe, since he
would be untried and have a high debt-equity ratio; moreover, the
collateral provided by his equipment would probably be very imper-
fect. He, too, would either have to borrow at high interest rates or
self-finance. Although the difficulties of financing investments in
human capital have usually been related to special properties of
human capital, in large measure they also seem to beset comparable
investments in physical capital.
A recurring theme is that young persons are especially prone to be
ignorant of their abilities and of the investment opportunities avail-
able. If so, investors in human capital, being younger, would be less
aware of opportunities and thus more likely to err than investors in
tangible capital. I suggested earlier that investors in human capital
are younger partly because of the cost in postponing their investment
to older ages. The desire to acquire additional knowledge about the
return and about alternatives provides an incentive to postpone any
risky investment, but since an investment in human capital is more
costly to postpone, it would be made earlier and presumably with less
knowledge than comparable nonhuman investments. Therefore, in-
vestors in human capital may not have less knowledge because of their
age; rather both might be a joint product of the incentive not to
delay investing.
The eighteen-year-old in our example who could not finance a pur-
chase of machinery might, without too much cost, postpone the in-
vestment for a number of years until his reputation and equity were
sufficient to provide the "personal" collateral required to borrow
funds. Financing may prove a more formidable obstacle to investors
in human capital because they cannot postpone their investment so
readily. Perhaps this accounts for the tendency of economists to stress
capital market imperfections when discussing investments in human
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3. Some Effects of Human Capital
Examples
Differences in earnings among persons, areas, or time periods are
usually said to result from differences in physical capital, technologi-
cal knowledge, ability, or institutions (such as unionization or social-
ized production). The previous discussion indicates, however, that in-
vestment in human capital also has an important effect on observed
earnings because earnings tend to be net of investment costs and gross
of investment returns. Indeed, an appreciation of the direct and in-
direct importance of human capital appears to resolve many otherwise
puzzling empirical findings about earnings. Consider the following
examples:
1. Almost all studies show that age-earnings profiles tend to be
steeper among more skilled and educated persons. I argued earlier
(Chapter II, section 1) that on-the-job training would steepen age-
earnings profiles, and the analysis of section 1 of this chapter general-
izes the argument to all human capital. For since observed earnings
are gross of returns and net of costs, investment in human capital at
younger ages would reduce observed earnings then and raise them at
older ages, thus steepening the age-earnings profile.
4
8 Likewise, invest-
ment in human capital would make the profile more concave.
4
9
48 According to equation (28), earnings at age ; can be approximated by
Yi = X, + J^ TkCk - Cj,
where X} are earnings at j of persons who have not invested in themselves, CK is
the investment at age k, and rk is its rate of return. The rate of increase in earn-
ings would be at least as steep in Y as in X at each age and not only from "younger"





ri ' - 1J'
This condition is usually satisfied since TjCj > 0 and the amount invested tends to
decline with age.
49 Following the notation of the previous footnote, Y would be more concave
than X if and only if
/AYj\ /AXj\ /r>CA /ACA
A ( - I - A ( - ) = A ( — I - A ( — ) < 0.
V A; / \Aj J \Aj J \ Aj J
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2. In recent years students of international trade theory have been
somewhat shaken by findings that the United States, said to have a
relative scarcity of labor and an abundance of capital, apparently ex-
ports relatively labor-intensive commodities and imports relatively
capital-intensive commodities. For example, one study found that
export industries pay higher wages than import-competing ones.
5
0
An interpretation consistent with the Ohlin-Heckscher emphasis on
the relative abundance of different factors argues that the United
States has an even more (relatively) abundant supply of human than
of physical capital. An increase in human capital would, however,
show up as an apparent increase in labor intensity since earnings are
gross of the return on such capital. Thus export industries might pay
higher wages than import-competing ones primarily because they
employ more skilled or healthier workers.
5
1
3. Several studies have tried to estimate empirically the elasticity of
substitution between capital and labor. Usually a ratio of the input
of physical capital (or output) to the input of labor is regressed on the
wage rate in different areas or time periods, the regression coefficient
being an estimate of the elasticity of substitution.
5
2 Countries, states,
or time periods that have relatively high wages and inputs of physical
capital also tend to have much human capital. Just as a correlation
between wages, physical capital, and human capital seems to obscure
the relationship between relative factor supplies and commodity prices,
so it obscures the relationship between relative factor supplies and
factor prices. For if wages were high primarily because of human
capital, a regression of the relative amount of physical capital on wages
both r, and C, would eventually decline, while the second term would be positive
because Cs would eventually decline at a decreasing rate. Consequently, the in-
equality would tend to hold and the earnings profile in Y would be more concave
than that in X.
50 See I. Kravis, "Wages and Foreign Trade," Review of Economics and Statistics,
February 1956.
51 This kind of interpretation has been put forward by many writers; see, for
example, the discussion in W. Leontief, "Factor Proportions and the Structure of
American Trade: Further Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," Review of Eco-
nomics and Statistics, November 1956.
52 Interstate estimates for several industries can be found in J. Minasian, "Elastici-
ties of Substitution and Constant-Output Demand Curves for Labor," Journal of
Political Economy, June 1961, pp. 261-270; intercountry estimates in Kenneth Ar-
row, Hollis B. Chenery, Bagicha Minhas, and Robert M. Solow, "Capital-Labor
Substitution and Economic Efficiency," Review of Economics and Statistics, August
1961.SOME EFFECTS OF HUMAN CAPITAL 97




4. A secular increase in average earnings has usually been said to
result from increases in technological knowledge and physical capital
per earner. The average earner, in effect, is supposed to benefit in-
directly from activities by entrepreneurs, investors, and others. An-
other explanation put forward in recent years argues that earnings
can rise because of direct investment in earners.
5
4 Instead of only
benefiting from activities by others, the average earner is made a prime
mover of development through the investment in himself.
5
5
Ability and the Distribution of Earnings
An emphasis on human capital not only helps explain differences in
earnings over time and among areas but also among persons or fami-
lies within an area. This application will be discussed in greater detail
than the others because a link is provided between earnings, ability,
and the incentive to invest in human capital.
Economists have long been aware that conventional measures of
ability—intelligence tests or aptitude scores, school grades, and person-
ality tests—while undoubtedly relevant at times, do not reliably meas-
ure the talents required to succeed in the economic sphere. The latter
consists of particular kinds of personality, persistence, and intelligence.
Accordingly, some writers have gone to the opposite extreme and
argued that the only relevant way to measure economic talent is by
53 Minasian's argument (in his article cited above, p. 264) that interstate varia-
tions in skill level necessarily bias his estimates toward unity is actually correct
only if skill is a perfect substitute for "labor." (In correspondence Minasian stated
that he intended to make this condition explicit.) If, on the other hand, human
and physical capital were perfect substitutes, I have shown (in an unpublished
memorandum) that the estimates would always have a downward bias, regardless
of the true substitution between labor and capital. Perhaps the most reasonable
assumption would be that physical capital is more complementary with human
capital than with labor; I have not, however, been able generally to determine the
direction of bias in this case.
54 The major figure here is T. W. Schultz. Of his many articles, see especially
"Education and Economic Growth," in Social Forces Influencing American Educa-
tion, Sixtieth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, Chicago,
1961, Part II, Chapter 3.
55 One caveat is called for, however. Since observed earnings are not only gross of
the return from investments in human capital but also are net of some costs, an
increased investment in human capital would both'raise and reduce earnings. Al-
though average earnings would tend to increase as long as the rate of return was
positive, the increase wouid be less than if the cost of human capital, like that of
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results, or by earnings themselves."'
6 Persons with higher earnings
would simply have more ability than others, and a skewed distribu-
tion of earnings would imply a skewed distribution of abilities. This
approach goes too far, however, in the opposite direction. The main
reason for relating ability to earning is to distinguish its effects from
differences in education, training, health, and other such factors, and
a definition equating ability and earnings ipso facto precludes such
a distinction. Nevertheless, results are relevant and should not be
ignored.
A compromise might be reached through definirig ability by earn-
ings only when several variables have been held constant. Since the
public is very concerned about separating ability from education,
on-the-job training, health, and other human capital, the amount in-
vested in such capital would have to be held constant. Although a
full analysis would also hold discrimination, nepotism, luck, and
several other factors constant, a reasonable first approximation would
say that if two persons have the same investment in human capital,
the one who earns more is demonstrating greater economic talent.
Since observed earnings are gross of the return on human capital,
they are affected by changes in the amount and rate of return. Indeed,
it has been shown that, after the investment period, earnings (Y) can
be simply approximated by
Y = X+rC, (67)
where C measures total investment costs, r the average-rate of return,
and X earnings when there is no investment in human capital. If the
distribution of X is ignored for now, Y would depend only on r when
C was held constant, so "ability" would be measured by the average
rate of return on human capital.
5
7
In most capital markets the amount invested is not the same for
everyone nor rigidly fixed for any given person, but depends in part
on the rate of return. Persons receiving a high marginal rate of return
would have an incentive to invest more than others.
5
8 Since marginal
56 Let me state again that the word "earnings" stands for real earnings, or the
sum of monetary earnings and the monetary equivalent of psychic earnings.
57 Since r is a function of C, Y would indirectly as well as directly depend on C,
and therefore the distribution of ability would depend on the amount of human
capital. Some persons might rank high in earnings and thus high in ability if
everyone were unskilled, and quite low if education and other training were wide-
spread.
58 In addition, they would find it easier to invest if the marginal return and the
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and average rates are presumably positively correlated
5
9 and since
ability is measured by the average rate, one can say that abler persons
would invest more than others. The end result would be a positive
correlation between ability and the investment in human capital,
6
0 a
correlation with several important implications.
One is that the tendency for abler persons to migrate, continue
their education,
6
1 and generally invest more in themselves can be
explained without recourse to an assumption that noneconomic forces
or demand conditions favor them at higher investment levels. A sec-
ond implication is that the separation of "nature from nurture," or
ability from education and other environmental factors, is apt to be
difficult, for high earnings would tend to signify both more ability
and a better environment. Thus the earnings differential between
college and high-school graduates does not measure the effect of col-
lege alone since college graduates are abler and would earn more
even without the additional education. Or reliable estimates of the
income elasticity of demand for children have been difficult to obtain




The main implication, however, is in personal income distribution.
At least ever since the time of Pigou economists have tried to reconcile
the strong skewness in the distribution of earnings and other income
with a presumed symmetrical distribution of abilities.
6
3 Pigou's main
suggestion—that property income is not symmetrically distributed—
does not directly help explain the skewness in earnings. Subsequent at-
tempts have largely concentrated on developing ad hoc random and
other probabilistic mechanisms that have little relation to the main-
59 According to a well-known formula,
where rm is the marginal rate of return, ra the average rate, and ea the elasticity of
the average rate with respect to the amount invested. The rates rm and ra would be
positively correlated unless ra and \/ea were sufficiently negatively correlated.
60 This kind of argument is not new; Marshall argued that business ability and
the ownership of physical capital would be positively correlated: "[economic] forces
. . . bring about the result that there is a far more close correspondence between
the ability of business men and the size of the businesses which they own than at
first sight would appear probable" (Principles of Economics, p. 312).
61 The first is frequently alleged (see, for example, ibid., p. 199). Evidence on the
second is discussed in Chapter IV, section 2.
62 See my "An Economic Analysis of Fertility," in Demographic and Economic
Change in Developed Countries, Special Conference 11, Princeton for NBER, 1960.
63 See A. C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare, 4th ed., London, 1950, Part IV,
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stream of economic thought.
6
4 The approach presented here, however,
offers an explanation that is not only consistent with economic analy-
sis but actually relies on one of its fundamental tenets, namely, that
the amount invested is a function of the rate of return expected. In
conjunction with the effect of human capital on earnings, this tenet
can explain several well-known properties of earnings distributions.
By definition, the distribution of earnings would be exactly the
same as the distribution of ability if everyone invested the same
amount in human capital; in particular, if ability were symmetrically
distributed, earnings would also be. Equation (67) shows that the
distribution of earnings would be exactly the same as the distribution
of investment if all persons were equally able; again, if investment
were symmetrically distributed, earnings would also be.
6
5 If ability
and investment both varied, earnings would tend to be skewed even
when ability and investment were not, but the skewness would be




64 A sophisticated example can be found in B. Mandelbrot, "The Vareto-Levy
Law and the Distribution of Income," International Economic Review, May 1960.
In a later paper, however, Mandelbrot brought in maximizing behavior (see "Pare-
tian Distributions and Income Maximization," Quarterly Journal of Economics,
February 1962).
65 J. Mincer ("Investment in Human Capital and Personal Income Distribution,"
Journal of Political Economy, August 1958) concluded that a symmetrical distribu-
tion of investment in education implies a skewed distribution of earnings because
he defines educational investment by school years rather than costs. If Mincer is
followed in assuming that everyone was equally able, that schooling was the only
investment, and that the cost of the nth year of schooling equaled the earnings of
persons with n — 1 years of schooling, then, say, a normal distribution of school-
ing can be shown to imply a log-normal distribution of school costs and thus a log-
normal distribution of earnings.
The difference between the earnings of persons with n — 1 and n years of school-
ing would be kn — Yn — yn_, = rnCn. Since rn is assumed to equal r for all n, and Cn — J'n_i. this equation becomes Yn = (1 + r) Yn_u and therefore
C, = Yo
C2 = r, = 70(l + r)
C3 = Y2 = K,(l + r) = ro(l + r)
2
C. = /„_,= •••= Ko(l + r)-"
1,
or the cost of each additional year of schooling increases at a constant rate. Since
total costs have the same distribution as (1 + r)", a symmetrical, say, a normal, dis-
tribution of school years, n, implies a log normal distribution of costs and hence by
equation (32) a log-normal distribution of earnings. I am indebted to Mincer for a
helpful discussion of the comparison and especially for the stimulation provided by
his pioneering work. Incidentally, his article and the dissertation on which it is
based cover a much broader area than has been indicated here.
66 For example, C. C. Craig has shown that the product of two independent
normal distributions is only slightly skewed (see his "On the Frequency Function
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It has been shown, however, that abler persons would tend to invest
more than others, so ability and investment would be positively cor-
related, perhaps quite strongly. Now the product of two symmetrical
distributions is more positively skewed the higher the positive corre-
lation between them, and might be quite skewed.
6
7 The economic
incentive given abler persons to invest relatively large amounts in
themselves does seem capable, therefore, of reconciling a strong posi-
tive skewness in earnings with a presumed symmetrical distribution of
abilities.
Variations in X help explain an important difference among skill
categories in the degree of skewness. The smaller the fraction of total
earnings resulting from investment in human capital—the smaller rC
relative to X—the more the distribution of earnings would be domi-
nated by the distribution of X. Higher-skill categories have a greater
average investment in human capital and thus presumably a larger
rC relative to X. The distribution of "unskilled ability," X, would,
therefore, tend to dominate the distribution of earnings in relatively
unskilled categories while the distribution of a product of ability and
the amount invested, rC, would dominate in skilled categories. Hence
if abilities were symmetrically distributed, earnings would tend to be




Equation (67) holds only when investment costs are small, which
tends to be true at later ages, say, after age thirty-five. Net earnings at
earlier ages would be given by
(68)
where / refers to the current year and i to previous years, C% measures
the investment cost of age i, Cj current costs, and r^ the rate of return
on Cj. The distribution of — Cj would be an important determinant
67 Craig (ibid., pp. 9-10) showed that the product of two normal distributions
would be more positively skewed the higher the positive correlation between them,
and that the skewness would be considerable with high correlations.
68 As noted earlier, X does not really represent earnings when there is no invest-
ment in human capital, but only earnings when there is no investment after the
initial age (be it 14, 25, or 6). Indeed, the developmental approach to child rearing
argues that earnings would be close to zero if there were no investment at all in
human capital. The distribution of X, therefore, would be at least partly deter-
mined by the distribution of investment before the initial age, and if it and ability
were positively correlated, X might be positively skewed, even though ability was
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of the distribution of Yj since investment is large at these ages. Hence
the analysis wouid predict a smaller (positive) skewness at younger
than at older ages partly because X would be more important relative
to Sr^i at younger ages and partly because the presumed negative cor-
y-i
relation between — Cj and Y~] riC would counteract the positive cor-
o
relation between rf and C{.
A simple analysis of the incentive to invest in human capital seems
capable of explaining, therefore, not only why the overall distribu-
tion of earnings is more skewed than the distribution of abilities, but
also why earnings are more skewed among older and skilled persons
than among younger and less skilled ones. The renewed interest in
investment in human capital may provide the means of bringing the
theory of personal income distribution back into economics.





The contribution of human capital to the distribution of earnings
could be easily calculated empirically if the rates of return and invest-
ments in equation (1) were known.
7
0 Although information on invest-
ment in human capital has grown significantly during the last few
years, it is still limited to aggregate relations for a small number of
countries. Much more is known about one component of these invest-
ments; namely, the period of time spent investing, as given, for
example, by years of schooling.
To utilize this information we have reformulated the analysis to
bring out explicitly the relation between earnings and the investment
period. The principal device used is to write the cost of the ;
t
h "year"
of investment to the i
t
h person as the fraction ktj of the earnings that
would be received if no investment was made during that year. If for
69 Reprinted from pp. 363-369 of an article by G. S. Becker and B. R. Chiswick
in American Economic Review, May 1966.
70 Equation (1):
where C,-;- is the amount spent by the i
t
h person on the ;
t
h investment, nj is his rate
of return on this investment, and A", is the effects of the original capital.EDUCATION AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF EARNINGS: 103
convenience r{j in equation (1) is replaced by r, + ri;*, where f; is the
average rate of return on the ;
t
h investment and rv* is the (positive or
negative) premium to the z
t
h person resulting from his (superior or
inferior) personal characteristics, then it can be shown that equation
(1) could be rewritten as
Ei = Xi\\ + kix{n + rn*)][\ + ki2(72 + r«*)] • • •
[1 + kiHi(Tnt + rin*)] (69)




1 If the effect
of luck and otlier such factors on earnings is now incorporated within
a multiplicative term e
ui, the log transform of equation (69) is
log Ei = log Xt + J£ log [1 + kiiiTj + m*)] + ut. (70)
By denning Xt — X (1 + a*), where «j measures the "unskilled" personal
characteristics of the i
th person, and ktj — kj + tijt where kj is the average
fraction for the ;
t
h investment, and by using the relation
log [1 + k^ + m*)] S k^ + r«*), (71)
equation (70) could be written as
log EiS* a+ 3jT/ + Vi, (72)
where a = log X, fj = A;f;, and
Vi = log (1 + ad + J] A;oro-* + X) '«
T> + "-
The term t/f largely shows the combined effect on earnings of luck and
ability. If the f'j was the same for each period of investment, the equa-
tion for earnings is simply
log Et9*a + I'm + Vi. (74)
If r', the average rate of return adjusted for the average fraction of
earnings foregone, and the investment period n4 were known, equation
71 The interested reader can find a proof for a somewhat special case in footnote
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(74) could be used to compute their contribution to the distribution of
earnings. For example, they would jointly "explain" the fraction
<75
)
of the total inequality in earnings, where a
2(n) is the variance of in-
vestment periods, and a
2(log E) is the variance of the log of earnings,
the measure of inequality in earnings.
7
2 Ability and luck together
would "explain" the fraction a'
2(v)/o-
2(log E), and the (perhaps nega-
tive) remainder of the inequality in earnings would be "explained" by
the covariance between ability, luck, and the investment period.
Even equations (72) and (74), simplified versions of (69), make ex-
cessive demands on the available data. For one thing, although the
period of formal schooling is now known with tolerable accuracy for
the populations of many countries, only bits and pieces are known
about the periods of formal and informal on-the-job training, and still
less about other kinds of human capital. Unfortunately, the only re-
course at present is to simplify further: by separating formal schooling
from other human capital, equation (72) becomes
logEi = a + Jf'^ + A, (76)
3 = 1
where f^ is the adjusted average rate of return on each of the first 5X
years of formal schooling, f 2 is a similar rate on each of the succeeding
S2 years of formal schooling, etc.;
St = 22 Sj *




includes the effect of other human capital.
A second difficulty is that although an almost bewildering array of
rates of return have been estimated in recent years, our empirical
analysis requires many more. Additional estimates could be developed
by making equation (76) do double duty: first it could be used to
estimate the adjusted rates and only then to show the contribution of
72 Note that this measure, one of the most commonly used measures of income
inequality, is not just arbitrarily introduced but is derived from the theory itself.EDUCATION AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF EARNINGS: 105
schooling, including these rates, to the distribution of earnings. If the
Sj and z/ were uncorrelated, an ordinary least squares regression of
log E on the Sj would give unbiased estimates on these rates, and,
therefore, of the contribution of schooling. If, however, the Sj and v'
were positively or negatively correlated, the estimated rates would be
biased upward or downward, and so would the estimated direct con-
tribution of schooling.
Some components of t/ are probably positively and others are nega-
tively correlated with years of schooling, and the net bias, therefore,
is not clear a priori. It is not unreasonable to assume that «j and u% in
equation (73) are only slightly correlated with the Sj. The r.y* term in
(73), on the other hand, would be positively correlated with the S;
7
3
since the theory developed earlier suggests that persons of superior
ability and other personal characteristics would invest more in them-
selves. Some empirical evidence indicates a positive correlation between
years of schooling and the amount invested in other human capital.
7
4
The term r/ depends, however, on the correlation between years of
schooling and years invested in other human capital, a correlation
which might well be negative. Certainly persons leaving school early
begin their on-the-job learning early, and possibly continue for a rela-
tively long time period (see fn. 75). Finally, one should note that
random errors in measuring the period of schooling would produce a
negative correlation between the measured period and v'. Although the
correlations between the S; and these components of z/ go in both
directions and thus to some extent must offset each other, a sizable
error probably remains in estimating the adjusted rates and the con-
tribution of schooling to the distribution of earnings.
Empirical Analysis
The sharpest regional difference in the United States in opportunities
and other characteristics is between the South and non-South, and
Table 1 presents some results of regressing the log of earnings on
years of schooling separately in each region for white males at least age
twenty-five. Adjusted average rates of return have been estimated by
these regressions separately for low, medium, and high education levels.
As columns 1, 2, 6, 7, and 8 indicate, the adjusted rates at each of these
school levels and the variances in the log of earnings and in years of
73 That is, unless a negative correlation between ki} and ri}* was sufficiently
strong.
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schooling are all a fair amount larger in the South. Moreover, these
differences in schooling and rates exceed the difference in earnings, for
as column 9 shows, the coefficient of determination, or the fraction of
the variance in the log of earnings "explained" by schooling, is con-
siderably higher in the South. The regional difference in earnings does
not entirely result from schooling, however, for column 10 shows that
the "residual" inequality in earnings is also larger in the South.
These results can be given an interesting interpretation within the
framework of the theory presented in the addendum "Human Capital
and the Personal Distribution of Income: An Analytical Approach."
The greater inequality in the distribution of schooling in the South is
presumably a consequence of the less equal opportunity even for whites
there and would only be strengthened by considering the differences in
schooling between whites and nonwhites. The higher adjusted rates of
return in the South
7
5 are probably related to the lower education levels
there, shown in column 4, which in turn might be the result of fewer
educational opportunities.
The residual xf is heavily influenced by the distributions of luck
and ability, which usually do not vary much between large regions.
Therefore, greater rates of return and inequality in the distribution of
schooling would go hand in hand not only with a greater absolute but
also with a greater relative contribution of schooling to the inequality
in earnings. The residual is also influenced, however, by investment
in other human capital. Since the rates of return to and distribution
of these investments would be influenced by the same forces influ-
encing schooling, the absolute, but not relative, contribution of the
residual to the inequality in earnings would tend to be greater when
the absolute contribution of schooling was greater. Consequently, our
theory can explain why both the coefficient of determination and the
residual variance in earnings are greater in the South.
In order to determine whether these relations hold not only for the
most extreme regional difference in the United States but also for
7
5 Higher rates of return to whites in the South have been found when estimated
by the "present value" method from data giving earnings classified by age, educa-
tion, and other variables (see G. Hanoch, "An Economic Analysis of Earnings and
Schooling," Journal of Human Resources, 2, Summer 1967, pp. 310-329). Although
estimates based on the present value method are also biased upward by a positive
correlation between ability and schooling and downward by errors in measuring
school years, they are less sensitive to the omission of other human capital (see
this volume, pp. 167-168). Consequently, the fact that Hanoch's estimates are almost
uniformly higher than ours (after adjustment for the kt) suggests, if anything, a
negative correlation between school years and the years invested in other human
capital. This could also explain why Hanoch's rates tend to decline with increases
in years of schooling while ours tend to rise.108 INVESTMENT IN HUMAN CAPITAL: RATES OF RETURN
more moderate differences, similar regressions were calculated for all
fifty states. To avoid going into details at this time let us simply
report that the results strongly confirm those found at the extremes:
there is a very sizable positive correlation across states between in-
equality in adult male incomes, adjusted rates of return, inequality
in schooling, coefficients of determination, and residual inequality in
incomes, while they are all negatively related to the average level of
schooling and income. Whereas only about 18 per cent of the inequal-
ity in income within a state is explained, on the average, by schooling,
the remaining 82 per cent explained by the residual, about one-third
of the differences in inequality between states is directly explained by
schooling, one-third directly by the residual, and the remaining one-
third by both together through the positive correlation between them.
Similar calculations have also been made for several countries hav-
ing readily available data: United States, Canada, Mexico, Israel, and
Puerto Rico (treated as a country). Again there is a strong tendency
for areas with greater income inequality to have higher rates of return,
greater schooling inequality, higher coefficients of determination, and
greater residual inequality. While there is also a tendency for poorer
countries to have lower average years of schooling, greater inequality
in income, etc., there are a couple of notable exceptions. For example,
Israel, for reasons rather clearly related to the immigration of edu-
cated Europeans during the 1920s and 1930s, had unusually high
schooling levels and low inequality in earnings until the immigration
of uneducated Africans and Asians after 1948 began to lower average
education levels and raise the inequality in earnings.
Addendum: Human Capital and the Personal Distribution
of Income: An Analytical Approach*
1. Introduction
Interest among economists in the distribution of income has as long
a history as modern economics itself. Smith, Mill, Ricardo, and others
recognized that many problems of considerable economic importance
partly turned on various aspects of income distribution. Although they
denned poverty, for example, in absolute terms, they also recognized
that each generation's "poor" are mainly those significantly below the
average income level. In addition to poverty, the degree of opportu-
• Originally published as Woytinsky Lecture, University of Michigan, 1967.HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME 109
nity, aggregate savings, and investment, the distribution of family sizes
and the concentration of private economic power were believed to be
related to income distribution.
How does one explain then that in spite of the rapid accumulation
of empirical information and the persisting and even increasing inter-
est in some of these questions, such as poverty, economists have some-
what neglected the study of personal income distribution during the
past generation? In my judgment the fundamental reason is the ab-
sence, despite ingenious and valiant efforts, of a theory that both
articulates with general economic theory and is useful in explaining
actual differences among regions, countries, and time periods. By em-
phasizing investment in human capital one can develop a theory of
income distribution that satisfies both desiderata. This essay focuses on
the relation between investment in human capital and the distribution
of earnings and other income. The discussion is theoretical and no
systematic effort is made to test the theory empirically. I expect to
report on some quantitative tests in a future publication.
The next section sets out the basic theory determining the amount
invested in human capital by a "representative" person, and shows the
relation between earnings, investments, and rates of return. Essentially
all that is involved is the application to human capital of a framework
traditionally used to analyze investment in other capital, although
several modifications are introduced. Section 3 of the essay shifts the
attention from a single person to differences among persons, and shows
how the distribution of earnings and investments are determined by
the distributions of ability, tastes, subsidies, wealth, and other vari-
ables.
Section 4 uses the framework developed in sections 2 and 3 to
analyze the effects on the distribution of earnings of an increase in
the equality of opportunity, of a more efficient market for human
capital, of the use of tests and other "objective" criteria to ration
investments in human capital, and of legislation requiring a minimum
investment in human capital. Section 5 extends the discussion to the
distribution of property income, and suggests why such income, both
inherited and self-accumulated, is more unequally distributed than
earnings. Section 6 summarizes the discussion and adds a few conclu-
sions, and 7 is a mathematical appendix.
2. Optimal Investment in Human Capital
a. The model. I have shown elsewhere that what I call the "net"
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ings he would have at t if no human capital had been invested in him
(Xt) plus the total returns to him at t on investments made in him
earlier (kt) minus the cost to him of investments at t (Ct), as in
Et = Xt + kt- Ct. (78)
Total returns depend on the amounts invested and their rates of
return; for example, if returns on each investment were the same at all
ages during the labor force period,
7
6 total returns would be the sum of
the products of the amounts invested and their rates of return, ad-
justed for the finiteness of the labor force period. Equation (78) could
then be written as
where rt_j is the rate of return on capital invested at t — j and /t_; is the finite life adjustment. I applied this analysis to various problems,
including the shapes of age-earnings and age-wealth profiles, the rela-
tion between unemployment and on-the-job training, the so-called
Leontief paradox, and several others.
7
7
I suggested that differences in the total amounts invested by different
persons are related to differences in the rates of return obtainable, a
suggestion that can explain why white urban males with high IQs
acquire more education than others, or why the division of labor is
limited by the extent of the market.
7
8 I did not, however, systematically
develop a framework to explain why rates of return and investments
differ so greatly among persons. This essay tries to develop such a
framework. This not only provides a rigorous justification for these
suggestions in Human Capital, but also begins to provide an explana-
tion of the personal distribution of earnings.
The term Xt in equations (78) and (79) represents the earnings of a
person that are unrelated to human capital invested in him, and are
presumably, therefore, largely independent of his current choices.
Particularly in developed economies but perhaps in most, there is suffi-
cient investment in education, training, informal learning, health, and
just plain child rearing that the earnings unrelated to investment in
human capital are a small part of the total. Indeed, in the develop-
76 This is the "one-hoss shay" assumption applied to human capital.
77 See this volume, Chapters II—III.
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mental approaches to child rearing, all the earnings of a person are
ultimately attributed to different kinds of investments made in him.
7
9
Consequently, there is considerable justification for the assumption
that Xt is small and can be neglected, an assumption we make in this
paper. In any case a significant Xt only slightly complicates the analysis
and can be readily incorporated.
Another assumption made throughout most of the paper is that
human capital is homogeneous in the sense that all units are perfect
substitutes in production for each other and thus add the same amount
to earnings. Of course, this assumption does not deny that some units
may have been produced at considerably greater costs than others.
The assumption of homogeneous human capital clearly differs in de-
tail rather drastically from the usual emphasis on qualitative differ-
ences in education, training, and skills. I hope to demonstrate that
these differences, while descriptively realistic and useful, are not re-
quired to understand the basic forces determining the distribution of
earnings; indeed, they sometimes even distract attention from these
determinants. Section 3g does, however, generalize the analysis to
cover many kinds of human capital.
Chart 4 plots along the horizontal axis the amount invested in
human capital measured for convenience by its cost rather than in
physical units. Equal distances along the axis, therefore, do not neces-
sarily measure equal numbers of physical units.
The curve D shows the marginal benefit, for simplicity measured by
the rate of return, to a particular person on each additional dollar of
investment, and is supposed to represent his demand curve for human
capital. The curve S shows the effective marginal financing cost to him,
measured for simplicity by the rate of interest, of each additional dol-
lar invested, and represents in essence his supply curve of capital. If
D exceeded S, the marginal rate of return would exceed the marginal
rate of interest, and income would be increased by additional invest-
ment, while the opposite would be true if S exceeded D. Consequently,
income is maximized by investing up to the point where D = S, given
by p in the figure, and implying a total capital investment of OC0.
b. Demand curves. The marginal rate of return depends on the
time series of marginal returns and the marginal production cost of
investment: if returns are constant for a long labor force period, it
essentially equals the ratio of returns to these costs. Since all human
79 See S. J. Mushkin, "Health as an Investment," Journal of Political Economy,
70, Special Supplement, October 1962, pp. 149-151.112 INVESTMENT IN HUMAN CAPITAL: RATES OF RETURN
CHART 4
Supply and Demand Curves for Investment in Human Capital
Marginal rate of
return or cost
Human capital invested (dollars)
capital is assumed to be homogeneous, even an extremely large per-
centage change in the capital invested by any one person would have
a negligible effect on the total quantity of capital available. Conse-
quently, in order to explain why the demand curves for human capital
in Chart 4 are negatively inclined and not horizontal, other effects of
capital accumulation must be analyzed.
The principal characteristic that distinguishes human from other
kinds of capital is that, by definition, the former is embedded or
embodied in the person investing. This embodiment of human capital
is the most important reason why marginal benefits decline as addi-
tional capital is accumulated. One obvious implication of embodi-
ment is that since the memory capacity, physical size, etc. of each
investor is limited, eventually diminishing returns set in from produc-HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME 113
ing additional capital.
8
0 The result is increasing marginal costs of
producing a dollar of returns.
Closely dependent on the embodiment of human capital is the im-
portance of an investor's own time in the production of his own
human capital.
8
1 Own time is so important that an increase in the
amount invested in good part corresponds to an increase in the time
spent investing:
8
2 in fact the only commonly used measures of school-
ing and training are years of schooling and training, measures entirely
based on the input of own time. The cost of this time has been meas-
ured for several kinds of human capital, shown to be generally impor-
tant, and given the name "foregone earnings."
 8
3
If the elasticities of substitution between own time and teachers,
books, and other inputs were infinite, the use of own time and the
deferral of investments could be avoided, without cost, aside from the
limitations imposed by B, by an accumulation of all the desired cap-
ital instantaneously through complete substitution of other inputs for
own time. If substitution were significantly imperfect (which is the
more likely situation), the elimination of own time would cause the
marginal costs of producing human capital to be higher and rise faster
as capital was accumulated than if it was combined optimally with
other inputs. In the latter case, however, the accumulation of capital
is necessarily spread out over a period of calendar time called the
80 If
h = /(/, B),
where h is the number of units of capital produced by a person per unit time, / is
his production function, / is his capital investment in dollars per unit time, and B
represents his physical and mental powers, then eventually
81 The production function in the previous footnote can be expanded to
h=f(R, T,B),
where R is the rate of input of other resources, and T is the rate of input of the
investor's time per unit calendar time.
82 If the horizontal axis in Chart 4 were replaced by one measuring investment
time, the chart would be almost identical to those used in the "Austrian" theory
of capital to explain optimal aging of trees or wine. Indeed, the main relevance of
the Austrian approach in modern economics is to the study of investment in hu-
man capital!
83 See T. W. Schultz, "Capital Formation by Education," Journal of Political
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"investment period." Presumably there are optimal combinations of
inputs over an optimal investment period that maximizes the present
value of benefits from a given capital investment. The spreading out
of capital accumulation forced by the importance of own time can,
however, only reduce but not eliminate the decline in marginal bene-
fits as more is accumulated.
8
4
In the first place, with finite lifetimes, later investments cannot
produce returns for as long as earlier ones and, therefore, usually have
smaller total benefits. This effect is important in societies with heavy
adult mortality, but probably is not in the low mortality environment
of modern Western societies. For unless fewer than approximately
twenty years of working life remained, a reduction of, say, a year in
the number of years remaining does not have much effect on the
present value of benefits.
8
5 In the second place, later investments are
less profitable than earlier ones because the present value of net bene-
fits (or profits) is reduced merely by postponing them (and the reduc-
tion can be sizable, even for postponements of a few years).
8
6
A third consideration is probably of great importance, although one
cannot yet measure its quantitative significance. Since nobody can use
his time at any activity without taking with him all of his human
capital, the latter enters as an input along with his time in the produc-
tion of additional capital. Initially, at young ages, the value of the
time is small and probably even negative because parents or other
baby-sitting services must be employed if he is not in school, or other-
wise investing.
8
7 As he continues to invest, however, the capital accu-
mulated becomes increasingly valuable, and so does his time.
Other things being the same, an increase in the value of time raises
the marginal cost of later investments compared to earlier ones since
the former use more expensive time. For any given rate of increase in
its value as he ages, the costs of later investments are relatively greater,
the larger the share of foregone earnings in costs and the smaller the
84 The fact that a person's optimal stock of human capital is not immediately
reached is often used in explaining the shape of his demand curve for human
capital. On the problems in explaining why his optimal stock of nonhuman capital
is not immediately reached, see D. W. Jorgenson, "The Theory of Investment Be-
havior," in Determinants of Investment Behavior, Universities-National Bureau
Conference Series No. 18, Columbia University Press for NBER, 1967.
85 For a demonstration of this, see pp. 47^48.
86 See ibid., pp. 72-73.
87 For an attempt to measure the value of such services provided by elementary
schools, see B. Weisbrod, "Education and Investment in Human Capital," Journal
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elasticity of substitution between own time and other inputs.
8
8 One
other thing that may not remain the same is the productivity of time:
just as a greater amount of human capital is more productive than a
lesser amount of capital in the rest of the economy, so too it may be
more productive when used to produce additional human capital
itself.
8
9 Marginal costs of later investments would not be greater if
the increased productivity of own time was at least as great as its
increased value. Because own human capital is carried along with own
time, more productive or not, I am inclined to believe that its effect
on productivity would be less, at least eventually, than its effect on
the cost of own time. If so, the accumulation of human capital would
on balance eventually increase later investment costs,
9
0 and thus de-
crease the present value of later benefits.
To digress a moment, the presumption that the marginal costs of
typical firms are rising
9
1 is usually rationalized in terms of a limited
"entrepreneurial capacity," an input that can only be imperfectly
replaced by managers and other hired inputs. "Entrepreneurial capac-
ity" is a construct developed to reconcile competition, linear homo-
geneous production functions, and determinate firm sizes, and most
writers agree that there are no obvious empirical counterparts.
9
2 Indeed,
the extremely large size achieved by many firms suggests that, fre-
quently at least, entrepreneurial capacity is not very limiting. Per-
88 This elasticity is relevant because investors may try to economize on their
more costly time by substituting other inputs for time. Rough evidence of such
substitution in education is found in the tendency for more valuable resources to
be used per hour of the time of more advanced than less advanced students. The
elasticity probably does not exceed unity, however, since the share of foregone
earnings in total costs appears to rise with the level of education (see Schultz, op.
cit.).
89 If H measures the stock of human capital embodied in an investor, then the
production function in footnote 81 can be expanded to include H, as in
h = f(R, T, H, B).
The productivity of greater human capital means a positive sign to dh/dH.
90 Even if the effect on productivity continued to exceed that on the cost of own
time, diminishing returns would cause the decrease in investment costs to become
smaller and smaller over time. (For an illustration of this in a model that is quite
similar to, although more rigorously developed than, the one presented here, see Y.
Ben-Porath, "The Production of Human Capital and the Life Cycle of Earnings,"
Journal of Political Economy, August 1967). On the other hand, the decrease in
the present value of benefits that results from a decrease in the number of years
remaining would become larger and larger over time.
91 This presumption can be justified by the observation that usually only firms
producing a limited share of the output of an industry manage to survive.
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sons investing in human capital can be considered "firms" that com-
bine such capital perhaps with other resources to produce earning
power. Since "entrepreneurial" time is required to produce human
capital, and since the latter is embodied in the entrepreneur, teachers,
managers, and other hired resources can only imperfectly substitute
for him. Therefore, in this case, "entrepreneurial capacity" is a defi-
nite concept, has a clear empirical counterpart, and, as has been indi-
cated, can lead to significantly rising costs, which in turn limits the
size of these "firms."
It is the sum of monetary benefits and the monetary equivalent of
psychic benefits (which may be negative) from human capital, not just
the former alone, that determines the demand curve for capital invest-
ment. If one makes the usual assumption of diminishing monetary
equivalents, marginal psychic as well as monetary benefits would de-
cline as capital is accumulated. The considerable uncertainty about
future benefits also contributes to a negatively inclined demand curve
if there is increasing marginal aversion to risk as more capital is accu-
mulated.
c. Supply curves. The supply curves in Chart 4 show the marginal
cost of financing, as opposed to producing, an additional unit of cap-
ital. The marginal cost of financing can be measured, for simplicity,
by the rate of interest that must be paid to finance an additional
dollar of capital. If the annual repayment required on a "loan" was
constant for the remaining period of labor force participation, the
marginal rate of interest would simply equal the annual repayment
on an additional dollar of funds, adjusted upward for the finiteness of
the labor force period.
If the capital market were homogeneous, with no segmentation due
to special subsidies or taxes, transaction costs, legal restrictions on
lending or borrowing, etc., and if risk were constant, even a large
change in the amount of capital used by any person would have a
negligible effect on his marginal cost of funds since it would have a
negligible effect on the funds available to others. In the actual world,
however, the market for human capital is extremely segmented: there
are local subsidies to public elementary and high schools, state and
federal subsidies to certain undergraduate and graduate students,
transaction costs that often make own funds considerably cheaper than
borrowed funds, and significant legal limitations on the kind of bor-
rowing that is permitted. The result is that although certain sources
of funds are cheaper than others, the amounts available to any person
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for the funds tends to exceed their supply. This means that a person
accumulating capital must shift from the cheapest to the second cheap-
est and on eventually to expensive sources. This shift from less to more
expensive sources is primarily responsible for the positive inclination
of the supply curve of funds even to one person. The rate of increase
in each curve tends to be greater the greater the segmentation, since
there is then greater diversity in the cost of different sources, with
smaller amounts available from each.
The cheapest sources usually are gifts from parents, relatives, foun-
dations, and governments that can be used only for investment in
human capital. Their cost to investors is nil, and is represented in




Highly subsidized but not free loans from governments and uni-
versities, for example, that also can be used only for investment in
human capital are somewhat more expensive: they are represented by
the g'u segment of S. Then come the resources of investors themselves,
including inheritances and other outright gifts, that could be used
elsewhere. Their cost is measured by the foregone opportunities rep-
resented by the u'h segment of S. After these funds are exhausted,
investors must turn either to commercial loans in the marketplace or
to reductions in their own consumption during the investment period.
These funds are usually available only at considerably higher, and
somewhat rapidly rising costs: they are represented by the upward
sloped segment h'S.
As emphasized earlier, the accumulation of human capital is not
instantaneous, but is usually spread over a lengthy investment period.
The rate of increase in financing costs, like that in production costs,
would generally be less, the more slowly capital is accumulated be-
cause, for example, the accumulation of own resources could reduce
the need to rely on more expensive sources.
9
4 The rate of increase in
83 Conceptual separation of production costs from financial conditions suggests
that direct government and private subsidies to educational institutions and other
"firms" producing human capital might be included in the Og segment. When so
separated, demand curves incorporate all production costs, not only those borne by
investors themselves, supply curves incorporate all subsidies, and the rates of return
relate "private" returns to "social" costs (for definitions of "private" and "social"
see this volume, Chapter V).
94 Superficially, there are many actual examples of the cost of funds depending
on the period or stage of accumulation, such as the special subsidies to students of
medicine or advanced physics. Many of these are best treated, however, as ex-
amples of a segmented capital market for different kinds of human capital, and are
more appropriately discussed in section 3g, where the interaction among different
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each supply curve also depends, therefore, on the accumulation pat-
tern that is chosen.
d. Equilibrium. Since both the stream of benefits and of financing
costs depend on the path of capital accumulation, the latter cannot
be chosen with respect to either alone. The rational decision is to select
a path that maximizes the present value of "profits"; that is, the pres-
ent value of the difference between these benefits and costs. With a
model as general as the one presented so far, the supply and demand
curves shown in Chart 4 would not be uniquely determined nor inde-
pendent of each other. In order to justify, therefore, uniqueness and
independence and to permit a relatively simple analysis of income dis-
tribution, it is sufficient to assume that own time and hired inputs
are used in fixed proportions to produce human capital, that a unit
of hired inputs is available at a given price, and that a unit of own
time is also available at a given price (foregone earnings) up to a cer-
tain maximum amount, beyond which no time is available at any price.
If the analysis of income distribution presented in this essay turns out
to be useful, the implications of more general assumptions about the
production of human capital should be explored.
9
5
With these assumptions, the value of benefits is given by the area
under the unique demand curve shown in Chart 4, the value of
financing costs by that under the unique supply curve,
9
6 and the maxi-
mum difference is found by investing up to their point of intersection.
At that point, marginal benefits equal marginal financing costs, which
can be taken to mean that the marginal rate of return equals the mar-
ginal rate of interest.
Corresponding to the optimal accumulation path is an optimal in-
vestment period. If both the returns on each dollar invested and the
repayments on each dollar borrowed were constant for the remaining
labor force period, the current value of total profits, which is the
difference between total returns and total repayments, would rise
throughout the optimal investment period. A peak would be reached
at the end, remain constant at that level throughout the labor force
period, and then drop to zero.
85 A start is made by Ben-Porath, op. cit., section 4.
96 For simplicity, the figures in this essay plot along the vertical axis marginal
rates of return and interest on each additional dollar of investment rather than the
present or current values of marginal benefits and financing costs. If returns and
repayment costs were constant for indefinitely long periods, marginal rates of return
and interest would exactly equal the current values of the flow of benefits and
financing costs respectively on an additional dollar of investment.HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME 119
The earnings actually measured in national income accounts do not
purport to represent the profits on human capital. For one thing, the
costs of funds are not deducted from returns, regardless of whether
they consist of direct interest payments, foregone income, or unde-
sired reductions in consumption. During the investment period, more-
over, some and often all the costs of producing human capital are
implicitly deducted before reporting earnings.
9
7 Consequently, meas-
ured earnings after the investment period only represent total returns,
while during the period it is a hybrid of returns and production costs.
I discuss first and most extensively the factors determining the dis-
tribution of measured earnings after the investment period, and only
briefly consider the distribution of profits or of measured earnings
during this period.
A major assumption of the remainder of this essay is that actual
accumulation paths are always the same as optimal paths. Sufficient
conditions for this assumption are that all persons are rational
9
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and that neither uncertainty nor ignorance prevents them from achiev-
ing their aims. Of course, these are strong conditions, and a fuller
model would make room for irrationality, uncertainty, discrepancies
between actual and "desired" capital stocks, etc. Given, however, our
rudimentary knowledge of the forces generating income distributions,
it is instructive to determine how far even a simple model takes us.
What impresses me about this model are the many insights it appears
to provide into the forces generating inequality and skewness in the
distribution of earnings and other income. In any case, it can be easily
generalized to incorporate many of the considerations neglected, such
as uncertainty, or discrepancies between actual and "desired" capital
stocks.
3. The Distribution of Earnings
This model implies that the total amount invested in human capital
differs among persons because of differences in either demand or sup-
ply conditions: those with higher demand or lower supply curves
97 This intermingling of stocks and flows has many implications for age-earnings
and age-wealth profiles that have been discussed elsewhere (see this volume, Chap-
ters II, III, and VII).
98 Since all persons are very young during much of their investment period, it
may seem highly unrealistic to assume that their decisions are rational. Children
have their decisions guided, however, as well as partly financed, by their parents,
and as long as parents receive some monetary or psychic benefits from an increase
in their children's economic well-being, parents have an incentive to help children
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invest more than others. There is some evidence that in the United
States, persons with urban employment or high IQ and grades tend
to invest more in formal education than those with rural employment
or low IQ and grades partly because the former receive higher rates
of return." If the model is empirically correct, as assumed in the
remainder of the essay, the sizable observed differences in education,
10
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on-the-job training, and other kinds of human capital would suggest
sizable differences in either one or both sets of curves.
Persons who invest relatively large amounts in themselves tend to
receive relatively high profits and measured earnings after the invest-
ment period. If they invest more because of higher demand curves,
as D' is higher than D in Chart 4, both the area under the demand
curve and the difference between it and the area under a given supply
curve is greater (compare point p' with p). If they invest more because
of lower supply curves, the area under the supply curve for a given
capital investment is smaller, and the difference between it and the
area under a given demand curve, therefore, is greater.
a. "Egalitarian" approach. Instead of starting immediately with
variations in both supply and demand conditions, I first treat a couple
of important special cases. One of them assumes that demand condi-
tions are the same for everyone, and that the only cause of inequality
is differences in supply conditions. This can be considered an approxi-
mate representation of the "egalitarian" approach to the distributions
of investments in human capital and earnings, which assumes that
everyone more or less has the same capacity to benefit from investment
in human capital. Investment and earnings differ because of differences
in the environment; in luck, family wealth, subsidies, etc. which give
some the opportunity to invest more than others. Eliminating environ-
mental differences would eliminate these differences in opportunities,
and thereby eliminate the important differences in earnings and in-
vestments.
Adam Smith took this view in his The Wealth of Nations when he
said "The difference between the most dissimilar characters, between
a philosopher and a common street porter, for example, seems to arise




100 For example, the standard deviation of years of schooling exceeds three years
in more countries.
101 Modern Library edition, New York, 1937, p. 15. E. Cannan, ed., remarks that
Smith was following David Hume, who said "consider how nearly equal all men
are in their bodily force, and even in their mental powers and faculties, ere cul-
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Currently, many persons in the United States argue that most persons
are intrinsically equally capable of benefiting from a college education;
only poverty, ignorance, and prejudice prevent some from acquiring
one.
Generally, the most important cause of differences in opportunities
is differences in the availability of funds.
10
2 These in turn are derived
from the same segmentation in the capital market which implies that
cheaper funds are rationed, and that supply curves of funds are posi-
tively inclined even to individual investors. For a variety of reasons
cheaper funds are more accessible to some persons than to others, and
the former then have more favorable supply conditions. Some may
live in areas providing liberal government and other subsidies to in-
vestment in human capital, or receive special scholarships because of
luck or political contacts. Others may be born into wealthy families,
have generous parents, borrow on favorable terms, or willingly forego
consumption while investing. For all these reasons and more, supply
curves of funds could differ considerably, and Chart 5 shows a few that
differ in level or elasticity. For simplicity they are assumed to rise
more continuously than the supply curve depicted in Chart 4.
If supply conditions alone varied, the equilibrium positions of dif-
ferent persons would be given by the intersections of the common
demand curve with the different supply curves; the points plt p2, />3,
and p4 in Chart 5 represent a few such positions. Full knowledge of
these positions, of the marginal rate of return associated with each
amount of capital investment, would permit the common demand
curve to be "identified." Moreover, the marginal rates could themselves




Persons with favorable supply conditions would invest relatively
large amounts in themselves: the equilibrium positions in Chart 5 are
further to the right, the lower the supply curves are. The distribution
of the total capital invested obviously would be more unequal and
skewed, the more unequal and skewed was the distribution of supply
curves.
102 Of course, it is not the only cause; for example, discrimination and nepotism
are often important, and yet usually affect the benefits from rather than the
financial costs of investing in human capital.
103 Using the assumption that white males have the same demand curve for
formal education, G. Hanoch first estimated the marginal rates of return to educa-
tion from earning differentials between persons at different education levels, and
then "identified" their common demand curve. See his Personal Earnings and In-
vestment in Schooling, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1965, Chapter II.122 INVESTMENT IN HUMAN CAPITAL: RATES OF RETURN
CHART 5
Equilibrium Levels of Investment in Human Capital Resulting
from Differences in "Opportunities"
Marginal rate of
return or cost
0 Human capital invested (dollars)
If the labor force period was long, earnings would be related to the
amount of capital invested by
= 7C, (80)
where E is earnings, C the total capital invested, and f the average
rate of return on C. The distribution of E clearly depends on the dis-
tribution of C; indeed, if the demand curve for capital was completely
elastic, f would be the same for everyone, and the distributions ofHUMAN CAPITAL AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME 123
earnings and investments would be identical except for a difference
in units (f) that depended on the aggregate supply of and demand for
human capital. Since it is shown above that C is more unequally dis-
tributed and skewed the more unequal and skewed is the distribution
of supply curves, the same applies to the distribution of E.
As we have seen, the demand curve for capital investment is usually
negatively inclined rather than infinitely elastic primarily because
human capital is embodied in investors. E will, therefore, usually be
more equally distributed than C because a given percentage change in
C will change £ by a smaller percentage since f will decline as C in-
creases and increase as C declines. Moreover, both E and C will be
more unequally distributed and skewed the more elastic the demand
curve is; for the greater the latter, the more that persons with favor-
able supply conditions would be encouraged to invest still more by a
higher f; and the more that those with unfavorable supply conditions
would be encouraged to invest still less by a lower f.
Similarly, an increase in the elasticities of supply curves that held
constant their locations at the average value of C would also increase
the inequality and skewness in E and C. Persons with unfavorable
supply conditions would be encouraged to cut back their investments
at the same time that those with favorable conditions were encouraged
to expand theirs.
In the Mathematical Appendix exact relations between the distribu-
tions of E and C and the parameters of supply and demand curves are
derived under the special assumption that all supply curves have the
same constant elasticity, and that the demand curve also has a con-
stant elasticity. Among the results of this more special model is that
earnings are likely to be less unequally distributed and less skewed
than supply curves (that is, than opportunities).
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b. "Elite" approach. At the other end of the spectrum is the assump-
tion that supply conditions are identical and that demand conditions
alone vary among persons. This can be considered an approximate
representation of the "elite" approach to the distributions of invest-
ment in human capital and earnings, which assumes that everyone
more or less has effectively equal opportunities. Actual investments
and earnings differ primarily because of differences in the capacity to
benefit from investment in human capital: some persons are abler and
form an elite. In spite of the position taken by Smith and Hume,
educational policy in England and some other parts of Europe has
104 See section 6 of the Appendix.124 INVESTMENT IN HUMAN CAPITAL: RATES OF RETURN
been predicated on a version of the elite view: "There is a tendency
of long historical standing in English educational thought (it is not
nearly so visible in some other countries) to concentrate too much on
the interests of the abler persons in any group that is being considered
and to forget about the rest."
 10
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Just as opportunities have been measured primarily by supply
curves, so capacities are measured primarily by demand curves.
10
6 For
a given (dollar) amount invested, persons with higher demand curves
receive higher rates of return than others; or looked at differently,
they have to invest more than others to lower the marginal rate to a
given level. Since all human capital is assumed to be identical, de-
mand curves can be higher only if more units of capital are produced
by a given expenditure. It is natural to say that persons who produce




Since a higher demand curve means greater earnings from a given
investment, in effect, ability is being measured indirectly; namely, by
the earnings received when the investment in human capital is held
constant.
10
8 This approach is an appealing compromise between defi-
105 Fifteen to Eighteen, a report of the Central Advisory Council for Education,
Geoffrey Crowther, Chairman, 1959, p. 87. In addition, many formal models of
income distribution developed by economists are largely based on an underlying
distribution of abilities. See, for example, A. D. Roy, "The Distribution of Earnings
and of Individual Output," Economic Journal, 60, 1950, pp. 489-505, and B. Man-
delbrot, "Paretian Distributions and Income Maximization," Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 76, 1962, pp. 57-85.
106 Let me repeat, however, that some differences in opportunities, such as those
resulting from discrimination and nepotism, affect demand curves. Similarly, some
differences in capacities affect supply curves.
107 If the production function notation of footnote 81 is used, the z'th and ;'th
persons have the functions
hi = fi(Ri, Tit Bi)
hi = /,-(/?>, Tu Bi).
The jth person has more ability if /4 > f} when R and T, the inputs of market
resources and own time, respectively, are held constant. If sometimes /( > f, and
sometimes f} >/«, there is no unique ranking of their abilities.
Note, however, that since demand curves incorporate psychic benefits and costs
from human capital as well as monetary ones, i could have a higher demand curve
than ;, and thus be considered to have more capacity, simply because he receives
more psychic benefits than ; does.
108 Note the similar definition by R. H. Tawney: "In so far as the individuals
between whom comparison is made belong to a homogeneous group, whose mem-
bers have equal opportunities of health and education, of entering remunerative
occupations, and of obtaining access to profitable financial knowledge, it is plausible,
no doubt, if all questions of chance and fortune are excluded, to treat the varying
positions which they ultimately occupy as the expression of differences in their
personal qualities" (Equality, Capricorn Books edition, New York, 1961, p. 121).HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME 125
nitions of ability in terms of scores on IQ, personality, or motivation
tests without regard to the effect on earnings, and definitions in terms
of earnings without regard to opportunities.
10
9 The former pay exces-
sive attention to form and not enough to results, while the latter
hopelessly confound "nature" and "nurture," or ability and environ-
ment. Our approach directly relates ability to results, and at the same
time recognizes the impact that environment has on results.
11
0
If demand curves alone varied, the capital investments and mar-
ginal rates of return of different persons would be found at the inter-
sections of the different demand curves with the common supply curve.
In Chart 6 there clearly is a positive relation between the height of a
demand curve, the amount of capital invested and the marginal rate.
Knowledge of the latter two quantities for many different persons
would permit an "identification" of the common supply curve, just as
such information earlier permitted an "identification" of a common
demand curve.
An important difference, however, is that the marginal rates them-
selves could not now be "identified" from information on the earnings
and investments of different persons alone. In Chart 6 the marginal
rate of return to investing OC^ rather than OC2 would be propor-
tional to the area p2C.2Caq2 for persons with the demand D2 and to
the larger area q^C2C-sp^ for those with D3. If a marginal rate was
simply estimated from the difference in earnings between persons
investing OC2 and OC:i, the estimate would be proportional to
D2p2C2Czp.AD?>, which clearly greatly exceeds both true rates. To arrive at correct estimates, either the earnings of persons investing
OC2 would be adjusted upward by the area D3D2p2*/3>
 o
r the earnings
of those investing OC3 adjusted downward by the area DHD2q2pz.
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Note, incidentally, that those arguing that most of the differences in
earnings between persons at different levels of education or training
result from differences in ability are essentially assuming a com-
mon supply curve and steeply inclined demand curves.
Aside from chance, Tawney mainly stresses the importance of holding constant
health, education, and financial knowledge, which are simply different kinds of
human capital.
109 For a review of these definitions in the context of analyzing income distribu-
tions, see H. Staehle, "Ability, Wages, and Income," The Review of Economics and
Statistics, 25, 1943, pp. 77-87.
noi have not tried to explain why some people are "abler" than others; this
might ultimately be traced back to differences in numerous basic ability "factors."
For a model of this kind, see Mandelbrot, op. cit.
in Some adjustments along these lines to estimated rates of return on formal
education can be found in this volume, pp. 202-204.CHART 6
Equilibrium Levels of Investment in Human Capital Resulting
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Earnings and capital investments are clearly more unequally dis-
tributed and skewed the more unequally distributed and skewed
are demand curves. The same kind of arguments as those used in the
previous section should make it apparent that both distributions are
also more unequal and skewed, the greater the elasticities of the
supply and demand curves. If the supply curve was positively in-
clined, the average rate of return would tend to be greater, the larger
the amount invested. Therefore, earnings would tend to be more
unequally distributed and skewed than investments.
In the Mathematical Appendix exact relations between the distribu-
tions of earnings and capital investment and the parameters of the
supply and demand curves are derived under the special assumption
that all demand curves have the same constant elasticity, and that
the supply curve also has a constant elasticity. One of the more
interesting results is that earnings and investments would necessarily
be more unequally distributed and skewed than demand curves.
11
2 If,
for example, demand curves (i.e., capacities) were symmetrically dis-
tributed, both earnings and investments would be skewed to the right.
c. A comparison of these approaches. Before moving on to the
general case that incorporates variations in both supply and demand
conditions, it is illuminating to contrast the more important implica-
tions of these special cases. For under the guise of the "egalitarian"
and "elite" approaches, they are frequently explicitly advanced and
are still more widely implicitly assumed.
The "egalitarian" approach implies that the marginal rate of return
is lower, the larger the amount invested in human capital, while the
"elite" approach implies the opposite relation. Marginal rates ol
return appear
11
3 to decline in the United States as years of schooling
increase, which supports the "egalitarian" approach. However, in
Canada, a country in many economic respects quite similar to the




112 See section 4 of the mathematical appendix on p. 138.
H31 say "appear" because these rates have not been fully corrected for dif-
ferences in the average level of "ability" at different education levels; such a correc-
tion might eliminate the apparent decline (see Hanoch, op. cit., or this volume,
p. 202).
H4 See J. R. Podoluk, Earnings and Education, Dominion Bureau of Statistics,
1965. Note that since different years of schooling are not perfect substitutes, the
pattern of rates are also affected by the relative demand for and supply of different
years. Thus the relatively small number of college-educated persons in Canada
might explain the relatively high rates of return to college education there.128 INVESTMENT IN HUMAN CAPITAL: RATES OF RETURN
The inequality in earnings tends to be less than that in supply
conditions in the "egalitarian" approach, and greater than that in
demand conditions in the "elite" approach because the former implies
a negative, and the latter a positive, correlation between rates of re-
turn and amounts invested. Put differently and perhaps more in-
terestingly, to understand the observed inequality in earnings, the
"egalitarian" approach has to presume greater inequality in oppor-
tunities than the "elite" one has to presume about capacities. In-
equality in earnings is a more serious problem to the former, there-
fore, in the sense that a given observed amount implies greater under-
lying "inequities" or "noncompeting groups"
 11
5 than it does to the
latter.
For a similar reason, the positive skewness in earnings is probably
less than that in opportunities under the "egalitarian" approach
and greater than that in capacities under the "elite" approach. In-
deed, as pointed out in the last section, it is shown in the Mathematical
Appendix using the assumptions of constant and identical elasticities
of demand, and a constant elasticity of supply, that a symmetrical
distribution of capacities necessarily results in a positively skewed
distribution of earnings. Therefore, an age-old problem of economists
—how to reconcile a skewed distribution of income with a presumed
symmetrical normal distribution of abilities
116—turns out to be no
problem at all.
11
7 In the "egalitarian" approach, on the other hand,
observed skewness is more difficult to explain because it implies still
greater skewness in the distribution of opportunities, a skewness that




us The interpretation of income inequality in terms of noncompeting groups
was popular among nineteenth and early twentieth century writers. For a review
see H. Dal ton, Some Aspects of the Inequality of Incomes in Modern Communities,
London, 1920, Part II. "Groups" may be noncompeting either because of differences
in opportunities, as assumed in the "egalitarian" approach, or because of differences
in capacities, as assumed in the "elite" approach.
us For example, A. C. Pigou said "Now, on the face of things, we should expect
that, if as there is reason to think, people's capacities are distributed on a plan of
this kind [i.e., according to a symmetrical normal distribution], their incomes will
be distributed in the same way. Why is not this expectation realized?" The Eco-
nomics of Welfare, 4th edition, New York, 1950, p. 650. See also P. A. Samuelson,
Economics, 6th edition, New York, 1964, pp. 120-121.
H7 It is not possible, however, to reconcile extremely large skewness in earnings
with a symmetrical distribution of capacities.
118 Pigou's principal answer to the question he sets out in footnote 116 is largely
based on a presumed skewed distribution of inheritances, which affects, among
other things, the distribution of investments in training (ibid., pp. 651-654). Or, as
Allyn Young said, "The worst thing in the present situation is undoubtedly theHUMAN CAPITAL AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME 129
d. A more general approach. If either all demand or all supply
curves were identical, the supply and demand curves of persons invest-
ing the same amount would also be identical if different demand or
different supply curves did not touch in the relevant region. This, in
turn, means that all persons investing the same amount would have
identical earnings. Yet if the amount invested is measured by years of
schooling, there is abundant evidence of considerable variability in the
earnings of persons with the same investment.
11
9 Possibly improved
measures of investment or the introduction of transitory earnings would
eliminate most of the variability; I suspect, however, that a significant
portion would remain. If so, neither special case—that is neither varia-
tions in demand nor in supply curves alone—is sufficient, although
one set of curves might vary much more than the other.
If both supply and demand curves varied, different persons could
invest the same amount, and yet some could earn more than others
because they had higher demand (and supply) curves; in Chart 7,
the same amount would be invested by persons with Dz and Slt D2
and S2, and Dt and 53. As this example indicates, knowledge of the
various equilibrium marginal rates of return and investments would
no longer be sufficient to identify either a supply or a demand curve
because the equilibrium positions would be on different curves.
Moreover, again the marginal rates themselves could not be identi-
fied from information on earnings and investments alone because
persons with different investments would generally have different de-
mand curves.
The distributions of earnings and investments would partly depend
on the same parameters already discussed: both would be more
unequal and skewed, the greater the elasticities of supply and de-
mand curves, and the more unequal and skewed their distributions.
The distributions of earnings and investments also depend, how-
extreme skewness of the income frequency curve . . . reflecting as it undoubtedly
does the presence of a high degree of inequality in the distribution of opportunity"
("Do the Statistics of the Concentration of Wealth in the United States Mean What
they are Commonly Assumed to Mean?," Journal of the American Statistical Associa-
tion, 15, 1917, pp. 481-482). One should point out, however, that even "a high
degree of inequality in the distribution of opportunity" is not sufficient to produce
skewness in earnings, and that skewed distribution of opportunities is necessary,
at least in the "egalitarian" approach.
us For example, the coefficient of variation in the incomes of white males aged
35-44 in 1949 was 0.60 for high school graduates and 0.75 for college graduates
(see this volume, Table 9, p. 182). Or in 1959, years of schooling explained less
than 20 per cent of the variance in the earnings of white males aged 25-64 in both
the South and non-South (see Table 1, p. 92).130 INVESTMENT IN HUMAN CAPITAL: RATES OF RETURN
CHART 7
Equilibrium Levels of Investment in Human Capital Resulting
from Differences in "Abilities" and "Opportunities"
Marginal rate of
return or cost
0 Human capital invested (dollars)
ever, on a new parameter: namely, the correlation between different
curves.
There are several reasons why supply conditions do not vary in-
dependently of demand conditions. Abler persons are more likelyHUMAN CAPITAL AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME 131
to receive public and private scholarships, and thus have their supply
curves shifted downward. Or children from higher-income families
probably, on the average, are more intelligent and receive greater
psychic benefits from human capital. On the other hand, private and
public "wars" on poverty can significantly lower the supply curves
of some poor persons. Since the first two considerations have, un-
questionably, been stronger than the third, it is reasonable to presume
a positive
12
0 correlation between supply and demand conditions, per-
haps a sizable one.
If supply and demand curves were uncorrelated, one might have
the equilibrium positions given by p31, p32, and p33 in Chart 7; if they
were negatively correlated, by p31, p22, and pX3; and if they were
positively correlated, by pu, p22,
 and £33- The chart clearly shows that
a positive correlation increases the inequality in both investments and
earnings; it also increases skewness by increasing the earnings and
investments of persons who would have relatively high earnings and
investments anyway.
An impression of a negative correlation between supply and de-
mand conditions—that is, between opportunities and capacities—is
sometimes obtained from persons investing the same amount. As the
curves D.A and Sv D2 and 52, and Dx and S3 in Chart 7 clearly show, however, the supply and demand curves of persons investing the same
amount must be negatively correlated, regardless of the true overall
correlation between them. Valid evidence of this latter correlation is
provided by information on the amount of variation in earnings "ex-
plained" (in the analysis of variance sense) by the variation in in-
vestments. For example, if the correlation between supply and de-
mand curves was perfect and positive, all the variation in earnings
would be "explained" by investments. Moreover, the smaller the
algebraic value of this correlation, the less the variation in earnings is
"explained" by investments, and the more that earnings vary among
perso'ns making the same investment.
Supplement: Estimating the Effect
of Family Background on Earnings
121
One important implication of the above analysis on the interaction
between opportunities and capacities (i.e., supply and demand condi-
120 By "positive" is meant that more favorable demand conditions are associated
with more favorable supply conditions.
121 The issues considered in this addendum were already briefly considered by
J. Mincer in "The Distribution of Labor Incomes: A Survey," Journal of Economic
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tions) was mentioned but not sufficiently stressed—namely, that op-
portunities and capacities would be negatively correlated for persons
investing the same amount, regardless of the overall correlation be-
tween them. For example, if, as many studies suggest, investment op-
portunities are less favorable to children in large families, ability and
number of siblings would be positively correlated for persons invest-
ing the same amount, even if they were negatively correlated in the
population as a whole.
12
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I want to stress, however, its importance in separating the effect of
family background on earnings from the effect of schooling. In recent
years, many studies have tried to separate these effects by running
multiple regressions of earnings on years of schooling and background
variables (and often other variables as well), and using the schooling
regression coefficients as a measure of the independent effect of school-
ing, and the background coefficient as a measure of the independent
effect of background.
12
3 Yet if years of schooling result not from random
behavior but from optimizing behavior, these studies may be seriously
understating the contribution of background to earnings and over-
stating that of schooling.
To show this in a dramatic fashion, assume that family background
only has an effect on opportunities, capacities being independent of
background, and that background is the only variable affecting op-
portunities. A series of equilibrium positions are shown in Chart 8:
b\, b2, ^3>
 and b4 are supply curves of particular persons with different
background (b4 is a more favorable background than b3, etcetera), and
dlt d2, ds, and d4 are their corresponding demand curves (or capacities). The optimal accumulation of capital by each person is given by the
intersection of his supply and demand curve, or by the points elt e2,
e3, and e4.
If the independent effect of background on earnings were estimated
from differences in earnings between persons with the same accumula-
tion of human capital but different backgrounds, point e2 would be
compared to ex or point e4 to e3. In both comparisons, persons with
122 This implication was derived and tested many years ago by R. A. Fisher. See
his The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection, 2nd ed., New York, 1958, Chapter
11.
123 See, for example, S. Bowles, "Schooling and Inequality from Generation to
Generation," Journal of Political Economy, 80, 3, Supplement, May-June, 1972; A.
Leibowitz, "Home Investments in Children," Journal of Political Economy, 82, 2,
Supplement, March-April, 1974; J. Coleman and P. Rossi, "Processes of Change in
Occupation and Income," mimeograph, 1974; or Louis Levy-Garboua, "Does School-
ing Pay?," Entroit de Consommation, 3, 1973.HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME
CHART 8
The Effect of Background and Ability on Earnings





higher backgrounds have lower earnings,
12
4 yet in this example a
better background certainly does not lower earning capacity. Of
course, the reason for this erroneous result is that persons with superior
backgrounds (i.e., superior opportunitities) would accumulate the same
amount of human capital as those with inferior backgrounds (i.e.,
inferior opportunities) only if the former have inferior earning
capacities.
A similar argument shows that the effect of human capital on earn-
ings is overstated when estimated from differences in earnings between
persons with the same background but different accumulations of
human capital. For they choose to invest different amounts only be-
124 Leibowitz, op. cit., Tables 4-6, does find a negative effect of mother's educa-
tion on earnings when own years of schooling are held constant. (However, she
also finds a positive coefficient for parent's income.)134 INVESTMENT IN HUMAN CAPITAL: RATES OF RETURN
cause they differ in earning capacity.
12
5 In other words, the effect of
human capital on earnings would be more accurately estimated if
background were omitted as a separate variable than if held constant.
The argument holds, more generally, when background affects earn-
ing capacity as well as opportunities, and other variables affect op-
portunities as well as capacities, if background is a major determinant
of opportunities, which is surely true, and other variables are a major
determinant of capacities, which is also true. A multiple regression of
earnings on background and human capital would then always under-
state the effect of background and overstate that of human capital.
In principle, the appropriate statistical procedure is a simultaneous
equations model that would "identify" the opportunities and capacities
functions, including the effects on both functions of background and
human capital accumulation. In practice, however, a good specification
is not easily obtained because information on variables that can
"shift" these functions is limited. Some progress can be made, however,
by starting with simple models. For example, the model depicted in
Chart 8 can be written as
rd = a + bH + u
r. = a + dH + yB + v
rd = ra,
where rd is the marginal rate of return on, and ra is the marginal cost
of, financing, the human capital accumulation H, u, and v represent
disturbance terms that are uncorrelated with each other and with the
exogenous background variable B, and b < 0, d > 0, and y < 0. Then
the demand function can be identified—i.e., b can be estimated—by
using the reduced form equations: r regressed on B and H regressed on
B. The supply function is not identifiable in this system but would be
also if there were information on exogenous "ability" variables that
only entered the demand function.
e. The effects of age. A common method of explaining the rise in
the inequality of earnings with age is to introduce random influences
and let their effects partly accumulate over time.
12
6 An alternative
method suggested by our analysis is to introduce earnings during the
investment period. It has already been stressed that investing in hu-
125 Again, Leibowitz finds that controlling for background tends to raise the
estimated effect of schooling.
126 See, for example, J. Aitchison and J. A. C. Brown, The Lognormal Distribu-
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man capital takes time primarily because an investor's own time is
an important input into the investment process. Persons who invest
relatively little tend also to cease investing at relatively early ages; for
example, dropouts from elementary school generally cease investing
before college graduates do. If, therefore, persons with higher demand
or lower supply curves tend to have longer investment periods as well
as larger investments,
12
7 the accrued earnings (that is, the area under
demand curves) of persons with high earnings would increase for
longer periods than would those of others. The effect would be greater
inequality in the distribution of accrued earnings at older ages as long
as an appreciable number of persons are still investing. In other words,
inequality could rise with age because it takes abler persons and those
with favorable opportunities longer to reach their full earning power.
Measured earnings differ, however, from accrued earnings during
investment periods partly because the income and capital accounts
are confounded: measured are derived from accrued earnings only
after some investment costs are deducted. Since the amounts de-
ducted are large and variable, measured earnings during investment
periods may be only weakly positively or even negatively correlated
with earnings afterwards.
12
8 The effect of mixing earnings and in-
vestment costs on the inequality in earnings is less clear-cut. On the
one hand, inequality is decreased because high earners invest larger
amounts and for longer periods; on the other hand, the inequality
is increased by the variation among persons in the amounts deducted.
/. Profits on human capital. The profits on investments in human
capital are not measured by earnings or returns alone, but rather by
the difference between returns and repayment costs. Geometrically, they
do not equal the area under a demand curve alone, but the difference
between the areas under a demand and supply curve. Although profits
are obviously less than earnings, the former are not necessarily dis-
tributed either less or more unequally than the latter. Indeed, a very
useful theorem proved in the Appendix states that if all demand curves
had the same constant elasticity, and if supply curves also did, the
percentage difference between earnings and profits would be the same
for everyone, and thus the distribution of profits would be exactly
127 They necessarily have larger investments if supply and demand curves are not
negatively correlated.
128 For one piece of evidence indicating virtually no correlation, see J. Mincer,
"On-the-Job Training: Costs, Returns, and Some Implications," Journal of Political
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the same, aside from scale, as the distribution of earnings.
12
9 If con-
stant and identical elasticities can be taken as a rough first approxima-
tion to the truth, there is no need to dwell on the distribution of
profits, for it would depend on exactly the same variables already
discussed in detail for earnings. To summarize and apply those results:
profits would be more unequally distributed and skewed, the more
unequally distributed and skewed were the supply and demand curves,
the greater the positive correlation between these curves, and the
greater their elasticities.
g. Heterogeneous human capital. A major assumption has been that
all human capital is homogeneous, an assumption that conflicts with
obvious qualitative differences in types of education, on-the-job train-
ing, informal learning, etc. in the same way that the frequently used
assumption of homogeneous physical capital conflicts with myriad
observed differences in plant, equipment, etc. The advantage of these
assumptions is that by sweeping away qualitative detail—detail that,
incidentally, has received excessive attention in the literature on human
capital—one can concentrate on more fundamental relationships.
For those unable to accept, even tentatively, an assumption of
homogeneous human capital, let me hasten to stress that different
kinds can rather easily be incorporated into the analysis. For example,
with two kinds of capital, each person would have two sets of demand
and supply curves, and in equilibrium, marginal benefits and financing
costs would be equal for each set. The distribution of earnings would
still depend in the same way on the distributions and elasticities of
the supply and demand curves. The only significant new parameters
introduced are those giving the correlations between the different
supply and also between the different demand curves for the two
kinds of capital. These correlations measure the extent to which people
are relatively able or have access to funds on relatively favorable terms
for both kinds. These correlations are presumably positive, but by no
means perfect, because both ability and access to funds carry over to
some extent, but not perfectly, from one kind of capital to another. It
should be intuitively clear that positive correlations tend to make
both earnings and investments more unequally distributed and skewed,
for then persons who invest much (or little) in and earn much (or
little) from one kind of capital also tend to invest and earn much (or
little) from the other.
129 See section 8 of the Mathematical Appendix for a proof (pp. 143-145).HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME 137
4. Some Applications
The supply and demand curves for investment in human capital that
affect the distribution of earnings are not immutable, but are partly
determined by aspirations, private generosity, and public policy. Al-
though in a long run perspective all may be subject to change, the
variables influencing opportunities are more easily and immediately
influenced than are those influencing capacities. It is not surprising,
therefore, that the various institutions discussed in this section all in-
fluence the distribution of earnings through their impact on the dis-
tribution of opportunities. The institutions covered are rather diverse:
more "equal" opportunity, admission to education and other training
institutions on the basis of "objective" testing, compulsory minimum
schooling and other investments, and improvements in the capital
market. Their diversity and importance demonstrates the value of our
analysis in relating the distribution of earnings to private and public
actions.
a. Equality of opportunity. An avowed goal of many countries, es-
pecially the United States, has been to achieve "equality of oppor-
tunity," yet the meaning and implications of this term have not been
carefully explored.
13
0 A natural statement within our framework is:
equality of opportunity implies that all supply curves are identical,
with opportunity being more unequal, the greater their dispersion.
A full definition might also include elimination of public and private
discrimination and nepotism, which would limit the dispersion in
demand curves as well. The implications of this statement can be easily
derived by building on the analysis developed in the last section.
For example, if supply curves were identical and discrimination
and nepotism eliminated, earnings and investments would differ es-
sentially because of differences in capacities, a major goal of those
advocating equal opportunity.
13
1 Therefore, the "egalitarian" ap-
130 One of the better statements is by Tawney: "[Equality of opportunity] obtains
in so far as, and only in so far as, each member of a community, whatever his birth,
or occupation, or social position, possesses in fact, and not merely in form, equal
chances of using to the full his natural endowments of physique, of character, and
of intelligence" (Equality, op. cit., p. 106). Tawney does not, however, relate this
definition to any analysis of income inequality.
131 Tawney said: "The inequality which they [and Tawney] deplore is not in-
equality of personal gifts, but of the social and economic environment" (Ibid., p.
38). Inequality in position in Michael Young's "meritocracy" is entirely related to
inequality in ability. See his The Rise of the Meritocracy 1870-2033, New York,
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proach to distribution implies that equalizing opportunity would
essentially eliminate all the inequality in earnings and investments,
while the "elite" approach denies that it would make any essential
difference.
The effect of equal opportunity on the inequality in earnings and
investments is also clear-cut. If supply and demand curves were not
negatively correlated, and if equal opportunity did not raise the alge-
braic value of this correlation or the absolute values of the supply and
demand elasticities, then it must reduce the inequality in earnings.
The reason is simply that one of the basic determinants of inequality,
the dispersion in supply curves (and partly also in demand curves),
is eliminated while the others are not affected "perversely." Unless
the correlation between supply and demand curves was positive and
sizable, the reduction in the inequality of earnings would be less than
that in investments, however, because the elimination of inequality in
supply curves would raise the correlation between investments and
rates of return, which would partly offset the reduction in the in-
equality of investments.
Identical supply curves can be achieved in many ways: subsidies to
institutions providing investments, such as through the public schools;
scholarships to investors, especially poorer ones; government-financed
or insured loans to investors; "head start" programs for poorer children;
and so on. Probably the most desirable system is to subsidize the
external or "neighborhood" cultural, political, and economic benefits
of investments, and develop loan programs to finance the direct or
private benefits.
13
2 Only if external benefits completely dominated,
which is not true even for education,
13
3 would this lead to "free"
investments.
b. Objective selection. Often confused with policies that equalize
opportunities are those that ration entrance into highly subsidized
schools and other investment institutions not by "favoritism," but by
"objective" standards, such as scores on special examinations, grades or
class standing in prior training, etc. Of the many examples throughout
132 The first and most discussed proposal along these lines can be found in M.
Friedman, "The Role of Government in Education," in Economics and the Public
Interest, Robert A. Solow, ed., New Brunswick, N.J., 1955, pp. 123-144. For a variant
of the Friedman proposal see W. Vickrey, "A Proposal for Student Loans," in
Economics of Higher Education, S. J. Mushkin, ed., Washington, D.C., 1962, pp.
268-280.
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the world, one can mention the examinations at the end of middle
schooling in Japan that have sharply limited the number going on to
public higher schools,
13
4 the "eleven plus" examinations in Great
Britain that have determined entrance into grammar schools,
13
5 or the
high-school records that help determine admission to the University of
California, Harvard University, and many other universities in the
United States.
"Objective" selection is an illusion in the "egalitarian" approach
to distribution because if differences in capacities are unimportant,
selection cannot be "objective" and must be subjective. This explains
why there is continuous pressure on public universities in the United
States to admit essentially all applicants meeting minimum qualifica-
tions. There is greater justification within the "elite" approach; not
surprisingly, therefore, "objective" selection has been prominent in
countries like Great Britain and Japan. If differences in capacities are
obvious and substantial, tests administered even as early as ages eleven
or fifteen can select the more promising students.
Generally, persons failing examinations or other standards are not
prevented from continuing their investments; only the cost of funds
to them is greater. Objective standards clearly do not, therefore,
equalize opportunity because persons selected obtain funds under
relatively favorable conditions. Since a system of objective standards,
if used successfully, also tends to increase the positive correlation
between supply and demand conditions, the resulting inequality in
earnings and investments would exceed that under equality of oppor-
tunity.
13
6 Indeed, the resulting inequality would even tend to exceed
that under a system selecting applicants at random because objec-
tive standards encourage abler persons, who probably earn and in-
vest more than others anyway, to earn and invest still more because
they are heavily subsidized.
13
7
134 The pressure felt by parents and pupils has been known as "the examination
hell." See H. Passin, Society and Education in Japan, Teachers College, Columbia
University', 1965, pp. 104-108.
135 About four-fifths of the eleven- and twelve-year-olds are not admitted to
grammar schools. See Crowther, op. cit., p. 87. Although the others generally can
continue their education in "all age" or "secondary modern" schools, their chances
of continuing beyond age fifteen are considerably reduced because many of these
schools do not provide fifth and higher years of secondary schooling (ibid.).
136 Assuming, of course, that the elasticities of supply and demand curves and
the distribution of the latter are the same in both situations.
137 in the quote from the Crowther report in section 36 above there is an implied
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c. Compulsory minimum investments. Virtually every country has
laws requiring a minimum investment in human capital. Usually only
a minimum number of school years is required,
13
8 although sometimes
apprenticeship programs and other on-the-job training can be sub-
stituted. Since differences in the generosity or wealth of parents are a
major cause of inequality in the "egalitarian" approach to income dis-
tribution, minimum investment legislation would make sense under
that approach. For by imposing minimum standards, poorer and less
generous parents are forced to spend more on their children, which
improves the latter's opportunities and earnings. Since differences in
capacities are the major cause of inequality in the "elite" approach,




In Chart 9 let D be the demand curve and S the supply curve
of a particular person in the absence of minimum standards, and
OC8 be his equilibrium capital investment. If legislation is passed
requiring at least OCm, his supply curve would be shifted to the
curve CmS because his parents are forced to become more "generous,"
and his equilibrium investment would be increased to OCm. The dis-
tribution of investments would be truncated at OCm, with everyone
who would have invested less being brought up to that point.
14
0
Truncating the distribution of investments reduces the inequality
in investments and through that in earnings as well. In effect, the
inequality of opportunity is reduced by bringing supply curves closer
together;
14
1 indeed, by setting the minimum standard at least equal
138 For example, the British in practice require only attendance through age
fifteen. The Act of 1944 also required part-time education for those leaving before
age sixteen, but it has not been put into effect (see Crowther, op. cit., p. 105); for
the first half of this century the Dutch simply required seven consecutive years of
schooling. See M. M. Loren, Education in the Netherlands, Netherlands Informa-
tion Bureau, New York, 1942, p. 12.
139 Except, of course, to the extent that investment in human capital produces
significant external benefits.
140 in 1900 the Dutch passed a law providing for at least seven years of schooling;
by 1960 virtually no one in the male labor force had less and almost 60 per cent
were about at that level. Similarly, in 1951 about two-thirds of the persons in the
labor force in Great Britain had nine years of schooling, the minimum amount re-
quired, and only one in ten had less. See B. R. Chiswick, Human Capital and the
Distribution of Personal Income, Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1967. Edu-
cational distributions are not so truncated in the United States because different
states passed laws at different times and heavy internal migration and immigration
from abroad moved people from their educational origins.
141 If minimum standards, apply only to one kind of human capital, such as
schooling, some parental funds may simply be drawn away from other kinds, such as
on-the-job training, which would increase the dispersion in the supply of funds to
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CHART 9




Human capital invested (dollars)
to the maximum amount anyone would have invested, identical in-
vestments and full equality of opportunity could be obtained. More-
over, opportunity is equalized at the same time that the elasticities
of supply are drastically reduced (compare 5 with CmS in Chart 9),
which also contributes to a reduction in the inequality of earnings
and investments. As section 4e shows, however, greater equality is ob-
tained only at the expense of a less efficient allocation of the total in-
vestment in human capital.142 INVESTMENT IN HUMAN CAPITAL: RATES OF RETURN
Since the purpose of minimum standards is to offset the effects of
poverty and niggardliness, appropriate subsidies could in principle
achieve the same result without compulsion. The effectiveness of
voluntary investment in human capital is often underrated
 14
2 because
subsidies to human capital usually cover, at best, only a portion of
the earnings foregone. If they covered all costs, including those fore-
gone, almost all children, I am confident, would continue in school
through the age desired.
d. Improvements in the capital market. It was emphasized earlier
that the major cause of both the rise in the cost of funds as a person's
investments increased and the differences in the cost to different per-
sons is the rationing of cheaper sources of funds due to a segmentation
of the capital market. Government funds are generally the cheapest
because of subsidies, own funds are usually cheaper than those bor-
rowed commercially because of transaction costs and the difficulty of
using human capital as collateral, and so forth. Less segmentation—
due, for example, to a reduction in subsidies or transaction costs—
would narrow the spread among different sources, and thus both




An improvement in the capital market would, therefore, have some-
what conflicting effects on the distributions of earnings and of invest-
ments. A narrower dispersion of supply conditions reduces the in-
equality, while increased elasticities of supply increase both the
inequality and skewness in earnings and investment. Apparently,
skewness would tend to increase, but inequality could go in either
direction.
e. Equality and efficiency. The discussion of capital market improve-
ments, minimum investment legislation, and other changes in op-
portunities has emphasized inequality and skewness and ignored
efficiency. Yet the trade off and conflict between equity and efficiency
have occupied as much time of social commentators as any other
economic issue. One important advantage of the analytical framework
developed in this study is, therefore, that efficiency can be as easily and
142 "Voluntary staying-on seems both too haphazard and too precarious to be
depended on as the basis of a national system" (Crowther, op. cit., p. 107).
143 The reduced segmentation would contribute, therefore, to greater equality of
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systematically handled as distribution. This is now illustrated with
some examples previously discussed. It is shown, in particular, that,
while equality and efficiency are sometimes affected differently, they
also sometimes change in the same direction.
If subjective attitudes toward risk are ignored, the criterion for an
efficient allocation of the total investment in human capital is well
known; namely, that the marginal social rate of return be the same
for all persons. If one assumes that the ratio of social to private rates
is identical for everyone, this criterion simply requires equality be-
tween all marginal private rates, while inefficiency can be measured
quantitatively essentially by the inequality in these rates. Efficient
allocation of investment between human and other capital requires
that the marginal rates on each type of capital be equal to each other,
but this aspect of efficiency is not discussed here.
If all supply curves have infinite elasticities, equalizing oppor-
tunities not only reduces the inequality in earnings and investments,
but also reduces the inequality in marginal rates, which means that
the total investment in human capital is allocated more efficiently.
A reduction in the segmentation of the capital market that increases
the elasticities and reduces the dispersion of supply curves may or
may not reduce the inequality in earnings and investments, but does
tend to reduce the inequality in marginal rates, and thus improve
efficiency. On the other hand, compulsory minimum standards reduce
the inequality in earnings and investments, but by lowering supply
elasticities widen the inequality in marginal rates, and thereby reduce
efficiency.
Rising supply curves that are due to a segmented capital market
create an inefficient allocation of the total investment in human
capital by penalizing abler persons, who tend to invest more than
others. If the market could not be made less segmented, efficiency
could be increased by other, "second best," policies that favor the
abler. The use of objective standards to select applicants for admis-
sion to subsidized investment institutions does favor abler persons,
and could, therefore, offset the higher marginal cost of funds to them.
Consequently, although objective selection may result in large in-
equality in earnings and investments, it could help allocate efficiently
the total investment in human capital.
14
4
Even severe critics of the distribution of incomes have generally
protested only against unequal opportunities, and have treated in-
144 See section 9 of the mathematical appendix for a formal proof (p. 143).144 INVESTMENT IN HUMAN CAPITAL: RATES OF RETURN
equality resulting from differences in ability with indulgence, if not
positive affirmation.
14
5 Possibly this simply reflects a basic philo-
sophical distinction; I suspect, however, that partly reflected also is
an implicit judgment about the interaction between equality and
efficiency. By increasing the elasticities of and reducing the differ-
ences among supply curves, improved capital markets, scholarships
to the needy, compensatory education, and the like reduce the in-
equality in earnings and at the same time generally improve the allo-
cation of the total investment in human capital. The elasticities of
and differences among demand curves, on the other hand, are less
related to man-made factors, and more to the embodiment of capital
in human beings, differences in intelligence, and other basic forces
that are less easily corrected.
14
6
5. The Distribution of Property Income
The discussion now shifts from the distribution of human capital
and earnings to physical (that is, all nonhuman) capital and property
income. Although earnings constitute 75 to 80 per cent of total in-
comes in the United States and are a major determinant of its
distribution as well as level, property income should not be neglected
in a serious study of income distribution. For one thing, most of the
Anglo-Saxon literature on income distribution has stressed inheritance
and property income even more than earnings.
14
7 Moreover, since
property income is considerably more unequally distributed and
skewed than earnings, its contribution to income distribution greatly
exceeds that to income levels. Fortunately, the analysis developed in the
previous sections seems capable of explaining why property incomes
145 "Rightly interpreted, equality meant, not the absence of violent contrasts of
income and condition, but equal opportunities of becoming unequal" (Tawney, op.
cit., p. 105); "But the greater the approach towards equality of opportunity, the
more reasonable the contention that a distribution according to the value of work
done is just" (Dalton, op. cit., pp. 22-23); and in the meritocracy, "stratification has
been in accord with a principle of merit, generally accepted at all levels of society"
(Young, op. cit., p. 99).
146 Of course, even these forces could be offset by a system of taxes and subsidies,
as, say, through a progressive tax on earnings. Since a progressive tax reduces in-
equality by redistributing earnings from the top earners, it discourages their invest-
ment in human capital more than others, and thereby tends to allocate the total
investment in human capital less efficiently.
147 For example, H. Dalton's classic study of inequality (op. cit.) devotes one
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are so unequal and skewed, and even why only a small fraction of the
population appears to receive any inheritance.
The property income of any person can be divided into his "origi-
nal" income and that due to his own capital accumulations. "Origi-
nal" property income presumably comes from an inheritance and
cannot be neglected as readily as "original" earnings were; it is dis-
cussed shortly. "Own" property income depends on the amounts in-
vested and their rates of return, and assuming rational behavior
once again, these two determinants in turn depend on the supply
and demand curves for physical capital. The distributions of own
property income and earnings differ, therefore, if and only if the
distributions and elasticities of the supply and demand curves for
physical and human capital differ.
There are no obvious reasons why the distribution of demand
curves for physical and human capital differ significantly in any
particular direction, but the other determinants are another story.
Although the difference is sometimes exaggerated,
14
8 undoubtedly the
market for physical capital is less segmented than is that for human
capital. It was argued in section 4d that, while the net effect on
inequality of greater segmentation is not clear a priori, it does cause
lesser skewness.
Probably the major difference, however, is in the elasticities of de-
mand. Section 2 argued that the marginal rate of return to an in-
vestor in human capital declines with increases in the amount he
invests primarily because his human capital is embodied in himself
and, therefore, his time is a crucial input into the investment process.
Physical capital, on the other hand, is not embodied in people and
generally the amount owned is not a major input into additional
investments;
14
9 consequently, there is less reason to expect significant
declines in the rate of return to any investor in physical capital as
the amount invested increases.
Since demand curves for physical capital can be expected, therefore,
to be more elastic than those for human capital, abler investors can
be expected to specialize more in physical capital, that is, to invest
considerably more than the less able investors.
15
0 As shown earlier,
greater specialization causes the distributions of investments and in-
148 See my remarks on pp. 78-80.
149 The important exceptions are the examples beloved by the Austrians in their
approach to capital theory: the aging of trees, wines, etc.
150 This partly explains why some accumulations of physical capital dwarf any
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comes to be more unequally distributed and skewed. Primarily, there-
fore, because of differences in demand elasticities,
15
1 although aided
somewhat by differences in supply elasticities, our analysis implies that
investments in physical capital and property income are more un-
equally distributed and skewed than are investments in human capital
and earnings.
A person leaving an inheritance must decide how to distribute it
between human and physical capital: a rational aim is to select that
combination yielding maximum benefits. Since at least relatively small
investments in human capital apparently generally yield considerably
higher payoffs than those in physical capital,
15
2 one would expect the
preponderant part of small inheritances to be placed in human capital,
say in the form discussed earlier of gifts to children to finance their
education, training, and health.
15
3 Since statistics and discussions of
inheritance usually only include physical (that is, nonhuman) capital,
probably most small inheritances are overlooked entirely!
As the amount inherited by any person increased significantly, his
marginal rate of return on investments in human capital would de-
cline significantly, and at some point would be brought into line with
that obtainable on physical capital. The fraction going into the latter
would then increase. As his inheritance increased still further, the
marginal rates would decline on both forms of capital, but especially
on human capital because its demand curves are less elastic. A larger
and larger fraction would be placed in physical capital until, for ex-
tremely large inheritances, the preponderant part would be placed not
in human but in physical capital.
To summarize, the analysis developed in this paper can predict a
wide variety of facts about physical capital. Among them are why
large accumulations of physical capital dwarf any of human capital,
151 I pointed out earlier that investments in human capital yield declining rates
of return partly because the time remaining to collect returns becomes smaller and
smaller (if lifetimes are finite). The result is that human capital is accumulated over
a much shorter period of time than the length of a working lifetime. There is no
such time limitation on physical capital, and it can be and is accumulated throughout
a lifetime. Accordingly, the argument that property income is more unequally dis-
tributed and skewed than earnings because physical capital is accumulated for longer
periods of time than human capital is partly a special case of our argument in terms
of greater elasticities of demand.
152 See pp. 191-193.
153 just as these inheritances were assumed to affect the supply curves of funds for
own investment in human capital, so inheritances in physical capital could be
assumed to affect the supply curves of funds for own investments in such capital. The
supply of funds might then be more unequally distributed for physical than human
capital because, as shown in the following, inheritances invested in the former are
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why own property income is more unequally distributed and skewed
than earnings, why only a small and select part of the population
appears to receive any inheritance, and why inheritances used for
investments in human capital are less unequally distributed than those
used for physical capital.
6. Summary and Conclusions
The main purpose of this essay has been to develop a theory of the
distribution of earnings and to some extent of other income as well.
Earnings are made dependent on the amounts invested in human
capital, and the latter are assumed to be determined by a rational
comparison of benefits and costs. In other words, each person is
assumed to have a negatively inclined demand curve showing the
marginal benefit and a positively inclined supply curve showing the
marginal financing cost from an additional dollar of capital invested:
the optimal capital investment occurs where these two functions
intersect. The supply curve to an individual investor is positively in-
clined because the segmentation in the market for human capital
forces him to tap more costly funds as he expands his capital invest-
ment. His demand curve is negatively inclined because the embodiment
of human capital in investors makes their own time a major input into
the investment process. The rise in the value of this time as capital is
accumulated over calendar time, combined with the finiteness of work-
ing lives, eventually forces marginal benefits to decline as more capital
is accumulated.
The distributions of earnings and investments would then depend
on the distributions and shapes of these supply and demand curves.
The "egalitarian" approach to income distribution, which neglects
differences in demand and relates differences in supply to man-made
differences in opportunities, implies that earnings are probably more
equally distributed and less skewed than opportunities. The "elite"
approach, on the other hand, neglects differences in supply and relates
differences in demand to more intrinsic differences in capacities. It
implies that earnings are more unequally distributed and skewed than
capacities. A more general approach combines both differences in
supply and demand—that is, in opportunities and capacities—and
implies that earnings and investments are more unequally distributed
and skewed the more elastic are the supply and demand curves, the
more these curves are unequally distributed and skewed, and the greater
the positive correlation between them.
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of earnings and on the efficiency of the allocation of the total invest-
ment in human capital were analyzed. Greater "equality of oppor-
tunity" not only tends to reduce the inequality in earnings, but also
to increase the efficiency of the allocation. A less segmented capital
market also tends to improve the allocation, but it increases the
skewness and possibly also the inequality in the distribution of earn-
ings. The use of "objective" criteria to select applicants for admisson to
subsidized schools and other investment institutions could result in
considerable inequality in earnings. "Objective" selection, by its favor-
ing of abler investors, could, however, lead to a more efficient alloca-
tion since it could offset the penalty to abler investors from the posi-
tively sloped supply curves associated with a segmented capital market.
The analysis was also briefly applied to the distributions of physical
(that is, all nonhuman) capital and the property income yielded. Since
human capital is and physical capital is not embodied in investors,
the demand curves for investment in the former tend to be less elastic
than those for the latter. This can explain the observed greater in-
equality and skewness in the distributions of physical capital and
property income than human capital and earnings. Inheritances ap-
pear to be received by only a small and select part of the population
because small inheritances are invested in human capital and there-
fore are not reported in inheritance statistics. As the amount inherited
by any person increased, a larger and larger fraction would be in-
vested in physical capital. This can explain the sizable inequality in
reported inheritances and can contribute to the large inequality in
physical capital and property income.
The model developed in this essay can be looked upon as a special
case of a more general model that includes uncertainty,
15
4 discrepancies
between actual and desired capital stocks and investment rates,
random shocks, and so forth. Although I believe that the special model
is extremely useful in understanding actual income distributions, I
have not tried to defend this view with any systematic empirical tests.
Other empirical studies
15
5 do offer strong support for the relevance and
significance of the theory developed in this essay.
154 Reactions to uncertainty form the basis of the theory developed by M. Fried-
man in "Choice, Chance, and the Personal Distribution of Income," Journal of
Political Economy, 71, 1953, pp. 277-290.
155 See J. Mincer, Schooling, Experience, and Earnings, New York, NBER, 1974;
B. R. Chiswick, Income Inequality: Regional Analyses within a Human Capital
Framework, New York, NBER, 1974, and "The Average Level of Schooling and the
Intra-Regional Inequality of Income: A Clarification," American Economic Review,
58, 3, June 1968, pp. 495-500; and Becker and Chiswick, "Education and the Distri-
bution of Earnings," American Economic Review, 56, 2, May 1966, pp. 358-369.HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME 149
An important attraction of this theory is that it relies fundamentally
on maximizing behavior, the basic assumption of general economic
theory. Moreover, at the same time, various "institutional" factors
are incorporated: inheritance of property income, distribution of
abilities, subsidies to education and other human capital, unequal
opportunities, and other factors all have important parts in the dis-
cussion. The body of economic analysis rather desperately needs a
reliable theory of the distribution of incomes. Whether or not this
approach is ultimately judged to be satisfactory, it should demon-
strate that such a theory need not be a patchwork of Pareto distribu-
tions, ability vectors, and ad hoc probability mechanisms, but can
rely on the basic economic principles that have so often proven their
worth elsewhere.
7. Mathematical Appendix
1. If the returns on each investment in human capital were constant
for the whole remaining working lifetime, earnings of the j
t
h person
at some age p after the investment period was completed would be
C, (81)
where Xjp are the earnings at age p if there was no investment in
human capital, rj(C) is the rate of return on the C
t
h dollar in-
vested, fj is a correction for the finiteness of working lives, and C;
is the total capital investment. If Xjp is small enough to be neglected,
if working lives are long enough so that f}, = 1, and if the average
rate of return is defined as
(82)
equation (81) can be approximated by
Ej = TjCj, all p. (83)
The distribution of earnings would be related to the distributions of
average rates of return and total capital investment, and to the inter-
action between them. Although some useful insights can be obtained
from this relation,
15
6 the number is limited by-the fact that average
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rates and capital investments are themselves both derived from more
basic determinants of choice.
2. These determinants can easily be analyzed if investments are
assumed to be carried to the point where the marginal rates of return
just equal the marginal rates of cost. The function
h = DM) (84)















By the same formula the marginal rate of cost is
with
Equilibrium requires equality between these marginal rates, orHUMAN CAPITAL AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME 151
Each of these j equations is a function of a single variable alone,
Cj, and could, therefore, be solved for the set of optimal capital
investments. Equation (84) would then give the set of optimal rates
of return and (83) the set of earnings. Clearly the distribution of
earnings would depend solely on the supply and demand curves, the
Dj and 5;,
3. This dependency can be made explicit by assuming particular
functional forms for these curves; a simple form that is also a first







where a, and a, are constants and > 0, and bj and /?7 are constants de-
fined by
(92)
Equations (86) or (89) obviously imply that the marginal function has
the same constant elasticity as the average one.
Substituting equation (91) into (90) gives
1 / 1\ / 1\
— I 1 4- —I C
l & = a I 1 — —I f.-l/6i (QI)
or
1
1 — T \6i + A




 A, all;. (94)
Therefore, by equations (83) and (91)
i \ / bin f, i\\
1 -i-XKbT+JiV-b,))
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Note that for positive earnings b3, > 1, an important restriction on the
elasticities that is used later on. The distribution of earnings would
depend on the joint distribution of the four parameters bjt f3jt ajt and «y. To simplify the analysis still further assume that the elasticities of






Then by using the notation
0'b - 1)
equation (95) can be written more simply as
0(b - 1) 6Q3+ 1)
(98)
4. Before discussing the general case given by equation (98), a few
special cases are considered. If all supply curves were identical and
had an infinite elasticity: a, = a and /? = oo, (98) becomes
Ei = k'a*y (99)
while (94) becomes
The distributions of earnings and investments differ only by a constant.
A log transform of (99) gives
In Ej = In k' + b In ah (101)
and
er(ln E) = ba(\n a), (102)
where a is the standard deviation. Thus, the standard deviation of the
log of earnings, a common measure of inequality, would be positively
related to the elasticity of demand and to the standard deviation of
the location of the demand curves. The shape of the distribution of
E would also depend on b and on the distribution of a. For example,
if a had a log normal distribution, so would E, and its skewness would
be positively related to the size of b and the skewness of a. Indeed,HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME 153




Moreover, the distribution of E could be positively skewed even if
a was not, the more so the larger b. For example, if a was symmetric,
the values of a both below and above its mean would be increased
by the E transform (neglecting the new units k
f and except, of course,
for a < 1), but those above would be increased by greater absolute and
percentage amounts. The result would be a stretching out of the larger
values into an elongated tail, and the stretching would be greater, the
larger b was.
To show this more explicitly, let /(a) be the density distribution








If d and £. are the modes of a and E respectively,
£ < k'd\ (105)
which is evidence of the elongation of the right tail. The mode of
E is found by differentiating equation (104) and setting it equal to
zero. If a derivative is denoted by a dot (•) over the function differen-
tiated, one has
f(a)+f(a)j (i-1) £"^ = 0, (106)
or
Eub = LiiAfWl, (107) K f(")
where a' is the value of a that transforms into £.. Since £
1/b, 'A, 6 — 1,
and /(a') must all be positive, so must j(a
f). But if a were a unimodal
157 The simplest proof is to note that both the skewness and variance of a log
normal distribution depend only on the variance of the normal distribution ob-
tained by a log transformation (see J. Aitchison and J. A. C. Brown, op. cit., pp.
8-9).
158 See M. G. Kendall, The Advanced Theory of Statistics, London, 1945, Vol. I,
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distribution, j(a') would be positive only if a' < a, for f(d) = 0 by defi-
nition.
The discussion can be made more concrete by considering a couple
of well-known distributions. If a was uniformly distributed, its density
distribution would be
and, therefore, from equation (104)
f(E) =
 >k N,E^~\ (109)
A uniform distribution is transformed into a monotonically declining
distribution, the rate of decline being faster, the higher b. This long-
tailed distribution has exactly the same shape as the Pareto dis-
tribution, except that the exponent in the latter is < — 2, while




If a was approximately normally distributed, the mode of E would




where u is the mean and a the standard deviation of a. If b — 1 >( —
()
the mode of E would be at the origin and E would be another long-
tailed distribution. For smaller b, E would rise to a peak
16
1 at a value
for a' between u/2 and u, and then decline in a long tail.
159 For a comparison of several long-tailed distributions see H. Simon, "On a
Class of Skew Distribution Functions," Models of Man, New York, 1957, Chapter 9.
160 A proof is based on noting that for a normal distribution
fia) -v>
f(a) a - u
Then from equation (107)
161 Since the density of a is not zero when a = 0, the density of E would approach
infinity as E -> 0 and would decline to a local minimum at a value of a equal to
u - y/u
1 - 4(6 - l)<r
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5. If (3 was finite, equation (98) becomes
Ej = k"aj
 b + e , (111)
while (94) becomes
6Q9 + 1)
C + ^ (112)
The distributions of earnings and investments still differ only by a
constant. Since
.<*2#U*. 0.3)
the distribution of E and C would still be more unequal and skewed
than a, but the differences would be smaller than when /? = oo. As
b—> oo, the exponent in (111) and (112) would approach /? + 1.




 b + e , (114)
while the amount invested would equal
f _ L b + 0 (115"}
These distributions are the, same, aside from scale, only when (3 = 0
or b = oo. Otherwise, since 6/3 > /3(6 — 1), C would be more un-
equally distributed and skewed. Moreover, since (3(b — 1) < b + (3
unless b > 2 and /3 > 6/6 — 2, E would very likely be less skewed and
more equally distributed than a. A comparison of equations (111) and
(112) with (114) and (115) shows that E and C would be more unequal
and skewed for a given distribution of a.j, the demand curves, than for
the same distribution of ajt the supply curves.
7. If both dj and a, varied, Ej would be given by equation (98), and
the variance of the log of E would be
_ 1)2 (Q | ^
li .'(log a) + *j£±JI ,.(log a)156 INVESTMENT IN HUMAN CAPITAL: RATES OF RETURN
where R is the correlation coefficient between log a and log a. The
inequality in E would be positively related not only to b and /3 and
to the variation in a and a, but also to the correlation between the
latter pair. The variance in log E would exceed that in either log a
or log a unless <x
2(log a) was much less than <r
2(log a), R was very nega-
tive, and b and /? were rather small.
Note that the distribution of E (and of C) would be unaffected,
aside from scale, by equal percentage changes in all a^ or a,-. Thus
economy-wide changes in the cost of funds or the productivity of
human capital that change all average rates of return or all average
repayment costs by the same percentage could significantly affect aver-
age earnings and capital investments, but have no effect on the dis-
tributions around the averages. Therefore, the usual emphasis on skill
differentials in discussions of the distribution of earnings is completely
beside the point, in our model, if these differentials are measured by
average rates of return.
The skewness in E would be greater, the greater the skewness in
a and a, the larger b and /?, and the larger R. For example, if a and a
were log normally distributed, E would also be, with a skewness posi-
tively related to the variance of its log, which by equation (116) is
positively related to R. Again, if log a and log a were perfectly posi-




and Ej could be written as
Ej = kaf, (118)
with
For a given distribution of ajf equation (118) has the same shape as
(111): if dj was uniformly distributed, both are monotonically declin-
ing distributions of the Yule-Zipf class, while if a; was normally dis-
tributed, both are skewed distributions with modes given by equation
(110). The inequality and skewness in (118) however, always exceeds
that in (111), the difference being greater the larger d, the elasticity of
a with respect to a.
8. The contribution of investment in human capital to "profits" isHUMAN CAPITAL AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME 157
not measured by total returns alone, but by the difference between
them and total repayment costs:
Pi = ffii-~ifii. (119)
The distributions of P and E are exactly the same, however, aside from
scale, so that all the results in the previous sections apply to P as well
as E. For a proof, simply first substitute the definitions in equation
(91) into (119), and get




then substitute the optimal value of Cjf and have
»Q> - 1) /, ,I\ ( i |
or
P(b - 1) 6Q9+1)
Pi = n'ctj
 b + e ajt + P (122)
Thus, aside from a difference in scale, P, in equation (122) is exactly
the same as Ej in equation (98).
9. To maximize total earnings from a given total capital investment,
one
Max E = 2Ej = Zr/7,-, (123)
subject to 2C, = Co
which gives as a necessary condition
£. = \ all/, (124)
where A is the marginal rate of return; that is,
H J (125)
Equation (125) can be expressed in terms of the underlying parameters
as
-0 b
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Equation (126) necessarily holds if either a, = a, for all / and /? = oo,
or cij = a, for all / and b — oo. If b and /? are both positive and finite,
and «_, and a, both variable, then (126) can only hold if log a and log a
are perfectly correlated, and related by the linear equation
log OCJ = d + - log a,; (127)
otherwise the equilibrium marginal rates of return, the left-hand side
of (126), differ. One easily shows that the variance of the log of these
marginal rates is smaller, the smaller the variances of log a and log a,
and the larger the positive correlation between them.Part Two
Empirical Analysis
"An investment in knowledge pays the best interest."
Benjamin Franklin, Poor Richard's Almanack